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1 Introduction 
 
Our universe’s initial low-entropy state could be explained.1 In fact, some have tried to 
explain it.
2
 Jonathan Schaffer’s account of grounding and priority monism forces the conclusion 
that states of the cosmos are metaphysically explained by the cosmos itself.
3
 Axiarchic 
approaches to principled-based explanation suggest that some evaluative principle explains all of 
reality, including the initial low-entropy state.
4
 Quentin Smith ([2007], pp. 188-97) argued that 
every state of the cosmos is causally explained by some prior state, and that it is by virtue of 
such state-by-state explanation that the entire cosmos is accounted for, including the low-entropy 
state.
5
 There are also a great many attempts to scientifically explain the relevant state by appeal 
                                                             
1
 Even some of those who would insist that such a state is brute believe that it could be explained. See 
(Callendar, [2004a], p. 199, though cf. his comments in [2004b], p. 241). 
2
 It is worth emphasizing here, that most cosmologists working on the low-entropy initial condition vie for 
a dynamical explanation of that condition. As Andreas Albrecht ([2004], p. 374-5) noted, “…most cosmologists 
would instinctively take a different perspective. They would try and look further into the past and ask how such 
strange ‘initial’ conditions could possibly have been set up by whatever dynamical process went before.” 
3
 This is because, on Schaffer’s view, substances ground states, and because the cosmos grounds every 
other substance and also its own states. See (Schaffer [2009a], [2009b], [2010a], [2010b], [2013]). I am assuming 
that obtaining grounding relations (relations of dependence for nature and positive ontological status that are 
transitive, asymmetric, and well-founded) usually underwrite and back metaphysical explanations, much like 
obtaining causal relations usually underwrite and back causal explanations (see Woodward [2003], pp. 209-20. He 
seems to go in for the “backing” idea with respect to singular causal explanation. In fact, Strevens [2007, p. 237] 
remarked, “[t]he core of Woodward’s account of singular event explanation is the account of singular event 
causation…”) 
4
 I have in mind the work of Leslie ([1979]), Parfit ([2011], pp. 623-48), and Rescher ([2010]). 
5
 That is to say, the whole or entire collection of states is explained as soon as all of the parts or members of 
the collection are explained. See (Hume [1947]; and Paul Edwards [1959]), though the idea goes back to (William of 
Ockham [1957]; cf. Rescher’s discussion in [2010], pp. 22-25). 
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to inflation, pre-big bang models, and other developments in cosmology and cosmogeny.
6
 Here I 
address just one of these potential scientific explanations, specifically the explanation proposed 
by a cosmogenic model recently developed by Sean Carroll and Jennifer Chen (hereafter I will 
refer to this model with the designation ‘CC-M’). 
My examination of the CC-M will proceed as follows: Sect. 2 provides an informal 
explication of the CC-M. Sect. 3 argues that the CC-M is internally inconsistent, ambiguously 
described, and admittedly incomplete. I suggest that the aforementioned inconsistency, 
ambiguity, and incompleteness implies that the recommended scientific explanation of our low-
entropy state—a key motivation for proposing the CC-M—is not an actual scientific explanation 
of that state. Moreover, I argue in Sect. 4, that Carroll and Chen (henceforth C&C) cannot 
plausibly maintain that entropy is unbounded from above. Sect. 5 attempts to knock down the 
model’s recommended mechanisms for universe nucleation out of a background empty or 
asymptotically de Sitter space-time, and I conclude the paper in sect. 6 with an objection to the 
model from the formal nature of the causal relation. 
 
2 The Carroll-Chen Model 
 
Our universe began in an extremely smooth, non-empty homogeneous state.
7
 That initial 
non-empty smoothness or homogeneity just is the initial low-entropy state of the cosmos.
8
 Our 
best science suggests that our arrow of time points in the direction of entropic increase, since our 
best science suggests that time’s arrow reduces to the arrow of entropic increase.9 C&C find 
                                                             
6
 On the explanation from inflation see (Davies [1983]; but more recently Guth [2004], p. 37). Though 
there are many, attempted pre-big bang explanations can be found in work on ekpyrotic and cyclic universe models, 
for which see (Khoury et. al. [2001]; Khoury, et. al. [2002]; and Steinhardt and Turok [2002a], [2002b], [2005]). 
Holographic cosmogenic models also attempt to explain the low-entropy state. See particularly (Banks [2007]). 
7
 See on this (Davies [1980], pp. 160-1, and pp. 168-9; and Penrose [1981], pp. 247-9, [1989b]). According 
to observations which involve looking out past 300 million light years, the universe is generally homogenous and 
isotropic. See (Wu, Lahav, and Rees [1999], p. 225; and Weinberg [2008], p. 1).  
The standard Freidman-Lemaître-Robertson-Walker (FLRW) model predicts that the universe is 
remarkably isotropic and homogenous (in the sense specified by Wald [1984], pp. 92-3). See also (Lyth and Liddle 
[2009], p. 39; Penrose [2005], p. 718), inter alios. I should add that the EGS theorem (proven in Ehlers, Geren, and 
Sachs [1968]) establishes that our universe is FLRW solely on the basis of isotropy in propagating cosmic 
microwave background radiation (CMBR), and the Copernican principle (Smeenk [2013], p. 631). The fact that our 
universe is FLRW suggests that the distribution of matter in our universe is uniform (Smeenk [2013, p. 613]). Q.v. 
sect. 5.1 for more on this and related results. 
8
 The “early spatial uniformity represents the universe’s extraordinarily low initial entropy” (Penrose 
[2010], p. 76; Penrose [2005], pp. 706-7). How low and high entropy states are to be understood when gravity is in 
play is somewhat controversial (see the comments in Egan and Lineweaver ([2010], p. 1826).  Carroll, for example, 
takes issue with certain characterizations of maximum entropy. He believes that even black holes can increase in 
entropy by radiating away into empty space (hence my description of the initial low-entropy state as non-empty 
initial smoothness). See (Carroll [2010], pp. 302-3; Aguirre, Carroll, and Johnson [2011], pp. 18-9), and see (Page 
[2005], p. 10) for some precise details regarding black hole radiation emission and entropy increase. See also the 
broader discussions of entropy in (Albrecht [2004], pp. 371-4; Greene [2004], pp. 171-5; North [2011], p. 327; 
Penrose [1979], pp. 611-17,  [1989b], pp. 251-7, [2010], pp. 73-9; Price [1996], pp. 79-83, [2004], pp. 227-8; and 
Wald [1984], pp. 416-8, [2006], p. 395). Callendar ([2010], pp. 47-51) articulates some problems for the standard 
way of understanding entropy and gravity. Earman ([2006], pp. 417-8, cf. the comments on p. 427) is very skeptical 
of the contemporary orthodoxy on these matters. 
9
 Let me say here what I’m concerned with when I discuss or mention the arrow of time. First, I am not 
interested in the asymmetry of time itself. I am, however, concerned with the asymmetry of the contents of the 
cosmos (on this distinction see Price [1996], pp. 16-7; North [2011], p. 312). There are, therefore, many arrows of 
Christopher Gregory Weaver 
On the Carroll-Chen Model 
3 
 
Page 3 of 42 
 
these facts to be “unnatural”.10 Their model attempts to advance a promising strategy for 
understanding the arrow of time and initial smoothness naturally. The strategy itself recommends 
a scientific explanation of the initial smoothness and so also the arrow of time. This explanation 
has need of the conjecture that the initial low-entropy state was produced by way of “dynamical 
evolution from a generic state.”11 The following theses are indispensable to the proposed 
scientific explanation: 
 
(1): Our metagalaxy was produced by a background Universe which is an 
empty/pure (dS) or asymptotic (AsDS) de Sitter space-time.
12
 
(2): The Universe produced our metagalaxy by means of a fluctuation. Such a 
fluctuation gave birth to a proto-inflationary region. It was this region which 
sparked the process of eternal inflation that is responsible for the large-scale 
structure of our metagalaxy.
13
 
(3): Entropy is unbounded from above. 
 
I will now informally discuss each claim, and in the process shed more light on less central 
aspects of the CC-M. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
time, though some maintain that these arrows can be reduced to the thermodynamic arrow. It is this supposed 
principal arrow with which I’m worried when I comment on the arrow of time below. 
That the thermodynamic arrow of time should be understood in terms of the direction of entropic increase 
is the majority view these days. C&C ([2004], p. 3) remarked, “…the thermodynamic arrow of time is the direction 
picked out by this increase of entropy.” Dyson, Kleban, and Suskind ([2002], p. 1) stated, “[t]he low entropy starting 
point is the ultimate reason that the universe has an arrow of time, without which the second law would not make 
sense.” Cf. (Bousso [2012], pp. 2-3, and pp. 26-9) for a different view. The discussion of these sorts of issues in 
(North [2011]) is first-rate. 
10
 Carroll declared that “[a]mong the unnatural aspects of the universe, one stands out: time asymmetry” 
Carroll ([2008a], p. 48). In ([ibid.], p. 50) he remarked, “[t]he question remains: Why was the entropy low to start 
with? It seems very unnatural given that low-entropy states are so rare”. In his ([2006], p. 1132) he stated,  
“…the Universe that we observe seems remarkably unnatural. The entropy of the Universe is not 
nearly as large as it could be, although it is at least increasing; for some reason, the early Universe 
was in a state of incredibly low entropy.” 
The notions of naturalness and unnaturalness are left at an intuitive level, though C&C do seem to connect 
unnaturalness with improbability at times (see Carroll and Chen [2004], p. 3). C&C’s understanding of 
unnaturalness also clearly motivates their rejection of the doctrine that the initial smoothness of our cosmos is in no 
need of explanation. Carroll ([2006], p. 1132) stated, “[w]hen we come across a situation that seems unnatural or 
finely tuned, physicists seize upon it as a clue pointing towards some underlying mechanism that made it that way.” 
Cf. (Carroll [2010], p. 288). 
11
 (Carroll and Chen [2004], p. 6). They would go on to admit that, “[b]y taking seriously the ability of 
spacetime to expand and dilute degrees of freedom, we claim to have shown how an arrow of time can naturally 
arise dynamically in the course of the evolution from a generic boundary condition.” (Carroll and Chen [2004], p. 29 
emphasis mine). That the model portends to explain the low-entropy state is clear: “[t]his scenario explains why a 
universe like ours is likely to have begun via a period of inflation, and also provides an origin for the cosmological 
arrow of time” from (Carroll and Chen [2005], p. 1671). 
12
 Below, I follow the convention of Russian cosmologists in regarding the universes that help comprise the 
multiverse as metagalaxies which are spawned somehow by a background space-time which I will (not necessarily 
following the convention of others) call the ‘Universe’ (capital-U). See (Glushkov [2005], p. 16 who seems to 
follow the former convention), and Leslie’s ([1989], p. 1) point regarding the convention tied to the term 
‘metagalaxy’. 
13
 See (Carroll and Chen [2004], p. 5). 
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2.1 The Background de Sitter Space and Unbounded Entropy 
 
C&C seek a scientific explanation of our metagalaxy’s initial low-entropy state that does 
not include finely-tuned boundary conditions or temporally asymmetric micro-dynamics.
14
 In 
order to acquire such an explanation, C&C need a background Universe.
15
 This background 
space-time, has an initial Cauchy hypersurface with generic conditions that are wholly natural. 
There is also a sense in which the entire background space is admitted to be natural. For C&C, 
however, “natural means high-entropy”16, thus the background space-time can be understood as a 
“middle moment” (to borrow Carroll’s wording) with the highest amount of entropy that an 
individual interrelated cosmos with a positive vacuum energy can have. Carroll wrote: 
 
That middle moment was not finely tuned to some special very-low-entropy 
initial condition, as in typical bouncing models. It was as high as we could get, for 
a single connected universe in the presence of a positive vacuum energy. That's 
the trick: allowing entropy to continue to rise in both directions of time, even 
though it started out large to begin with.
17
 
 
In their ([2004]) depiction of the CC-M, the background space-time evolves in two directions 
away from some arbitrary generic initial surface. There is then further evolution on both sides of 
the surface into de Sitter phases with a positive cosmological constant.
18
 Details about the nature 
of the initial surface are left to the imagination, though C&C suggest that such specifics are 
irrelevant. Allowing for evolution away from the initial surface in two directions implies that 
C&C do permit an understanding of the initial surface as a surface which constitutes the place 
over which a type of initial condition can be defined. That initial condition will not be “an 
equilibrium state with maximal entropy.”19 In fact, such a condition over the initial Cauchy 
surface will be the surface “of minimum entropy.”20 Thus, entropy increases away from the 
initial surface in two directions. Such dual entropic increase constitutes the dependency base for 
two arrows of time. As the two sides of space-time approach their respective de Sitter phases, 
each arrow of time will become in some sense ambiguous. This is because empty de Sitter 
phases are in thermal equilibrium states.
21
 There is, therefore, no entropic increase once either 
side of the ultra-large scale structure reaches respective de Sitter phases, and this further implies 
                                                             
14
 See (Carroll and Chen [2004], p. 6 and p. 27). 
15
 Carroll ([2008a], p. 48) stated,  
“[i]ncreasingly, however, this puzzle [of the arrow of time and entropy] about the 
universe we observe hints at the existence of a much larger spacetime we do not observe. 
It adds support to the notion that we are part of a multiverse whose dynamics help to 
explain the seemingly unnatural features of our local vicinity.” 
16
 (Carroll and Chen [2004], p. 7). 
17
 (Carroll [2010], p. 362). 
18
 See (Carroll and Chen [2004], pp. 28-29). 
19
 (Carroll and Chen [2004], p. 27). I’m borrowing their wording here. The quotation in context is about 
something different, viz., the fact that the background space is never in an equilibrium state because baby universes 
can always be generated resulting in the further increase of entropy. 
20
 (Carroll and Chen [2004], p. 5). 
21
 Carroll ([2010], p. 355 emphasis mine) said, “De Sitter space is empty apart from the thin background of 
thermal radiation, so for the most part it is completely inhospitable to life; there is no arrow of time, since it’s in 
thermal equilibrium.” 
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that there are no arrows of time during the respective phases of the cosmic evolution of the 
Universe. 
In subsequent work, Carroll seems to modify the CC-M (this modified version of the 
account will be individuated via the locution ‘MCC-M’).22 MCC-M’s background space shares 
some affinities with the space-time described by Willem de Sitter’s solution to Einstein’s field 
equations. That solution’s line element is as follows (using de Sitter’s coordinates): 
 
                (
 
 
) (             )      (
 
 
)           (Eq. 1)23
(Eq.1) predicts that matter (what de Sitter called “world-matter”) is completely missing from the 
space, and so de Sitter’s space is empty.24 The background space of the MCC-M is likewise 
empty.
25
 (Eq. 1) suggests a metric which features a cosmological constant that is positive (q.v. 
note 23). In contemporary cosmology and astrophysics, the cosmological constant is thought to 
correspond to (dark) vacuum energy.
26
 Thus, de Sitter’s space-time includes a positive vacuum 
energy, and the same turns out to be true of the 
M
CC-M background space. Lastly, the geometry 
recommended by (Eq. 1) is such that the space described is hyperbolical.
27
 More generally, de 
Sitter space-time is represented as a Lorentzian 4-sphere within a Minkowskian 5-space with the 
following metric ds
2
 = dt
2
 – dw2 – dx2 – dy2 – dz2.28 (See the nice illustration of the space in 
Carroll [2006], p. 1135.) 
Because the Universe on the 
M
CC-M is a pure de Sitter space-time, it is past-geodesically 
complete.
29
 Moreover, Carroll describes the CC-M as one which starts with the assumption that 
                                                             
22
 As early as Carroll’s ([2006], p. 1134), the background space-time seems to become empty de Sitter. One 
also gets a hint of this in (Carroll [2010], pp. 362-3). 
23
 Given that r0 = 0 and that  = 
 
  
; where R corresponds to a positive constant, and r is the Schwarzschild 
radius. The equation is from (de Sitter [1918], p. 230); but see also the discussion in (de Sitter [1917], p. 7; and 
Earman [1995], p. 7).  
24
 (de Sitter [1918], p. 229). There was some early debate about whether or not de Sitter’s space was truly 
empty. Einstein ([1918], p. 272) argued that the space contained singularities. Arthur Eddington ([1923], p. 165) 
would go on to correctly judge that the supposed singularities were merely coordinate. See the discussion of these 
matters in (Earman [1995], pp. 5-11). 
25
 For all intents and purposes, the space is empty. Carroll ([2010], p. 355) remarked, “De Sitter space is 
empty apart from the thin background of thermal radiation…”. 
26
 Carroll ([2010], p. 308) defines vacuum energy as “a constant amount of energy inherent in every cubic 
centimeter of space, one that remains fixed throughout space and time.”  
It is interesting that some models try to get along without dark energy (see, for example, work on the 
Cardassian model in Freese [2003], p. 53; and Freese and Lewis [2002], p. 6). 
27
 (de Sitter [1918], p. 233). 
28
 (Penrose [2005], p. 747-8; Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler [1973], p. 745; and for an extensive treatment of 
de Sitter and anti-de Sitter space-times see Hawking and Ellis [1973], pp. 124-34; but vide etiam the discussions in 
Bousso [1998], [2000a]; and Ginsparg and Perry [1983], pp. 245-251). I should add here that de Sitter space is also 
thought to have infinite volume. See (Carroll and Chen [2004], p. 27). 
29
 Hawking and Ellis ([1973], p. 126) remarked,  
“de Sitter space is geodesically complete; however, there are points in space which 
cannot be joined to each other by any geodesic. This is in contrast to spaces with a 
positive definite metric, when geodesic completeness guarantees that any two points of a 
space can be joined by at least one geodesic.”  
Cf. Bousso, DeWolfe, and Myers ([2003], p. 300), who stated, “…de Sitter space has two disconnected 
infinities, one in the past and one in the future”. 
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the Universe is eternal,
30
 and interpreters of his work commonly understand the model to be 
committed to such eternality as well.
31
 
 
2.2 Nucleated Metagalaxies and Unbounded Entropy 
 
 de Sitter space is exceedingly cold, less than 10
-28
 o Kelvin, though its temperature is still 
above zero.
32
 The temperature of de Sitter space-time is positive because it possesses (quoting 
Gibbons and Hawking) “thermal radiation with a characteristic wavelength of the order of the 
Hubble radius.”33 The fact that de Sitter space-time has a positive temperature implies that that 
space-time countenances fluctuations which result (it is hoped by C&C) in the existence of 
“…new inflating patches, which can eventually evolve into universes like ours”.34 With a 
positive vacuum energy, and the positive temperature of the background space, fluctuations can 
cause an inflaton field to ascend its potential so as to produce the beginning stages of eternal 
inflation (i.e., the production of a sufficiently ample vacuum energy).
35
 And while it is true that 
our metagalaxy began in a very low-entropy state, that state exhibited more entropy than the 
relevant “tiny commoving volume of de Sitter” space “from which it arose…”36 This is because 
the entropy density per that tiny volume of de Sitter space is considerably low.
37
 The fluctuations 
in de Sitter space are not random, but are the consequence of the obtaining of a certain condition 
that is itself produced by the space. C&C remarked, “[b]ecause the entropy density of the 
                                                             
30
 (Carroll [2010, p. 350], pp. 361-2). Elsewhere, Carroll and Chen ([2004], p. 5 emphasis mine) stated:  
“We also predict that this structure should be recovered infinitely far into the past, with a 
reversed thermodynamic arrow of time. Our overall universe is therefore statistically 
time-symmetric about some Cauchy surface of minimum entropy.” 
 Carroll is forthright about his commitment to an eternal past. He appears to believe that a truly quantum 
cosmology will rub out our metagalaxy’s initial singularity and put to rest the claim that that singularity was a 
veritable beginning of time (see Carroll [2008b], p. 4, cf. pp. 6-7).  
31
 See (McInnes [2007], p. 22). 
32
 (Carroll ([2010], p. 313; Gibbons and Hawking [1977], p. 2739). 
33
 (Gibbons and Hawking [1977], p. 2739). 
34
 (Carroll and Chen [2005], p. 1673). “In the presence of an appropriate inflaton field, thermal fluctuations 
will occasionally conspire to produce a tiny, smooth region of space dominated by a large vacuum energy—the 
correct conditions for a proto-inflationary patch [15]” from ([ibid.]). 
35
 (Carroll and Chen [2004, p. 27]; Carroll [2006], p. 1133, [2008b], p. 8). With respect to how this might 
all precisely work, Carroll seems to rely heavily upon the tunneling story written down by Farhi, Guth, and Guven 
([1990]), he remarked: 
"…de Sitter space, the solution of Einstein's equation in the presence of a positive 
cosmological constant, is unstable; there must be some way for it to undergo a transition 
into a state with even more entropy. Chen and I imagined that the mechanism was the 
quantum creation of baby universes, as suggested by Farhi, Guth, and Guven [14]" 
(Carroll [2008b], p. 8 emphasis mine. Note [14] in the text refers the reader to Farhi, 
Guth, and Guven [1990]). 
There are some attempted improvements on the FGG model of nucleation. See, for example, (Fischler, Morgan, and 
Polchinski [1990]; and Linde [1992]). For a barrage of criticisms, see (Banks [2003]; Freivogel et. al. [2006]; and cf. 
Aguirre, Gratton, and Johnson [2007], p. 9). 
36
 (Carroll and Chen [2004], p. 26). 
37
 (Carroll and Chen [2005], p. 1673; Carroll [2006], p. 1133). This part of the story is significantly 
changed in Carroll’s more recent and more technical work with Anthony Aguirre and Matthew C. Johnson. They 
argue that “cosmological fluctuations to lower-entropy states should be thought of as the time reverse of a—
generally smooth, or at least gradual—natural evolution from a low-entropy state into equilibrium.” (Aguirre, 
Carroll and Johnson [2011], p. 1 emphasis in the original). 
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background is so low, it is easier to fluctuate into a small proto-inflationary patch than into a 
universe that looks like ours today.”38 Thus, thermal fluctuations, in an almost completely empty 
de Sitter space in which there is low entropy density in the background, yield a proto-inflationary 
patch out of which our metagalaxy can form via the mechanism of eternal inflation. 
Because advanced stages of the Universe’s evolution are empty de Sitter on both the CC-
M and 
M
CC-M, metagalaxy nucleation conditions arise. The birth of metagalaxy’s with 
respective eternally inflating phases yields an avenue for unbounded entropic increase.
39
 
The thesis of unbounded entropy has very clear implications. First, if (3) is true, then the 
amount of energy in the background space is infinite. Second, given (3), there are infinitely many 
degrees of freedom. And third, (3) implies that with respect to the Universe, there is no such 
thing as an entropic or thermodynamic equilibrium state. If any of these implications are proven 
false, it will follow by modus tollens that (3) is false as well. 
 
3 Inconsistency, Ambiguity, and Admitted Incompleteness 
 
 In this section, I will seek to maintain the following contentions: First, articulations of the 
model are inconsistent.
40
 Second, the CC-M is ambiguously described. Third, the scientific 
explanation of our initial non-empty and smooth state provided by the CC-M is admittedly 
incomplete.
41
 And fourth, given such admitted incompleteness, the aforementioned explanation 
fails to account for our arrow of time. 
On the CC-M, our metagalaxy is a closed and “essentially autonomous” system, “free 
from outside influences”.42 One might wonder how our metagalaxy achieved such independence 
on the CC-M. According to some of Carroll’s work, such independence was achieved by means 
of the  mechanism of metagalaxy nucleation developed by Edward Farhi, Alan Guth, and Jemal 
Guven ([1990], henceforth ‘FGG’). On the FGG, when there is successful nucleation, 
metagalaxies completely separate from their mother Universe. Here is Carroll’s description of 
the process: 
 
                                                             
38
 (Carroll and Chen [2005], p. 1673 emphasis in the original). 
39
 Carroll ([2010], p. 360-1) admitted:  
“Once baby universes are added to the game, the system is no longer in equilibrium, for 
the simple reason that there is no such thing as equilibrium. In the presence of a positive 
vacuum energy (according to this story), the entropy of the universe never reaches a 
maximum value and stays there, because there is no maximum value for the entropy of 
the universe—it can always increase, by creating new universes….By suggesting that 
there is no such thing as equilibrium, we can avoid this dilemma. It becomes natural to 
observe entropy increasing, simply because entropy can always increase.”  
(cf. his remarks in [ibid.], p. 365) 
40
 Unless otherwise indicated, in this section just about everything I say about the CC-M holds for the 
M
CC-
M. Therefore, (again, unless I indicate otherwise) wherever one sees ‘CC-M’, read ‘MCC-M’ as well. 
41
 Let me provide a bit of an apologia for what I’m up to in this section. First, both Carroll and Chen are 
completely honest and humble about the CC-M’s incompleteness. I do not mean to mercilessly pile on their worries 
about how to complete the model. My contention below will be that given scientific realism and the fact that 
substantive portions of the CC-M are admittedly not well-understood, one cannot plausibly maintain that the CC-M 
provides a bona fide explanation of the low-entropy state. That is an important academic and philosophical point. 
Second, subsequent sections of this paper criticize the model on the assumption that there are ways of providing the 
details. So even if one does not agree with the aforementioned contention, one will still have to respond to some 
damaging criticism. 
42
 (Carroll [2010], p. 335 emphasis in the original). 
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What we see is simultaneous fluctuation of the inflaton field, creating a bubble of 
false vacuum, and of space itself, creating a region that pinches off from the rest 
of the universe. The tiny throat that connects the two is a wormhole…But this 
wormhole is unstable and will quickly collapse to nothing, leaving us with two 
disconnected spacetimes: the original parent universe and the tiny baby.
43
 
 
Importantly though, the background de Sitter space (or the regions of that space that are empty 
de Sitter) have no respective arrows of time. This is because empty de Sitter space is in a state of 
thermal equilibrium. Prior to universe nucleation, there is no entropic increase. Such a fact 
(noted by Carroll himself [2010], p. 355) makes interpreting Carroll’s comments regarding the 
relationships between the arrows of time per metagalaxies, and the direction of time in the 
background space difficult to interpret, for he stated that “…local direction of time [i.e., the 
direction of time in our metagalaxy] may not be related to that of the background space-time.”44 
But again, with respect to the background space-time, or at least the appropriate regions thereof, 
there just is no direction of time. Something is awry. 
Is the FGG nucleation process governed by a time parameter? If it is, which time 
parameter is it? When we give attention to Carroll’s writings, we see in them a clear commitment 
to the thesis that the nucleation process is in fact governed by a temporal metric or time 
parameter. For example, Carroll’s illustration of the nucleation process in (Carroll ([2010], p. 
357, Fig. 85) includes a time axis. That figure indicates that the process of FGG tunneling and 
metagalaxy nucleation occurs in time. In fact, Carroll believes that the background Universe 
increases its entropy through the nucleation of universes which themselves increase in thermal 
entropy, and this process of entropy increase is thought to be something which transpires in time.  
But which time? It cannot be a local time peculiar to the nucleated metagalaxy, for that entire 
space-time does not come into being until it pinches off near the end of the process. Likewise, 
the time parameter governing the Universe cannot be the time parameter governing the entire 
process of entropic increase via nucleation, since Carroll insists that on the heels of the pinching 
off stage of the process, one is left with two completely independent and autonomous space-
times. Such independence is a consequence of the assumed mechanism of universe nucleation. 
FGG entails that no worldline can be drawn from mother to baby universe. In fact, for FGG-style 
mechanisms “no causal curve from the original phase can enter the new phase after the tunneling 
event…”45 Thus, in order for the process to be one which occurs in time, a hyper or external time 
parameter is required.
46
  
The idea of an external time parameter is implausible. Carroll disapproves of the idea: 
 
The weirdest thing about the idea that the space of states changes with time is that 
it requires an external time parameter—a concept of “time” that lives outside the 
actual universe, and through which the universe evolves…There’s not much to 
                                                             
43
 (Carroll [2010], pp. 357-8 emphasis mine; cf. Carroll [2008b], p. 56). 
44
 (Carroll [2006], p. 1134).  
45
 (Aguirre, Gratton, and Johnson [2007], p. 123501-9). Their comments pertain to a generalization of the 
geometry of the FGG mechanism, what they call ‘“L” tunneling geometry’. Importantly, these authors go on to point 
out that “[h]olographic considerations would seem to conflict with the L geometries (at least for transitions to higher 
vacuum energy)…” [ibid.] Carroll takes the holographic principle seriously. He ([2010], p. 281) stated, “[t]he 
holographic principle is a very general idea; it should be a feature of whatever theory of quantum gravity eventually 
turns out to be right.”  
46
 The criticism is essentially Eric Winsberg’s (qq.v. note 48 and 49 below). 
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say about this idea. It’s possible, but very few people advocate it as an approach 
to the arrow-of-time problem.
274
 It would require a dramatic rethinking of the way 
we currently understand the laws of physics; nothing about our current framework 
suggests the existence of a time parameter lurking outside the universe itself. So 
for now, we can’t rule it out, but it doesn’t give us a warm and fuzzy feeling.47  
 
A criticism akin to the one I have articulated here was voiced by Eric Winsberg.
48
 Winsberg 
would no doubt agree, that if (as Carroll insists) the model entails a never ceasing increase in 
entropy (in time) through the nucleation of universes, then there is “an external time parameter, 
something Carroll explicitly, and correctly rejects…”49 
 A second inconsistency rears its head subsequent to reflecting upon the nature of the 
initial Cauchy hypersurface in the CC-M (and here I lean on Nikolić [2008], p. 2).50 That initial 
hypersurface is thought to be generic. But this is not so. At every Cauchy hypersurface of the 
background space, save the initial Cauchy hypersurface, entropy increases away from that 
hypersurface out along a single direction in time. Only at the initial Cauchy hypersurface does 
entropy increase in two directions. And so I agree with Nikolić, “…the initial hypersurface 
having two directions of time is not typical at all.”51  
  Although I will discuss scientific issues relevant to claim (2) below, I want to 
immediately point out a perceived ambiguity and incompleteness in Carroll’s discussion of 
universe nucleation. First, I have already noted above, that Carroll (qq.v. p. 6, n. 35) interprets 
his work with Chen in such a way that it is committed to the quantum tunneling mechanism of 
FGG.
52
 But something is amiss. In their original ([2004]) paper, C&C explicitly deny that their 
mechanism of nucleation involves any such quantum tunneling process. They stated: 
                                                             
47
 (Carroll [2010], pp. 341-2 emphasis mine). 
48
 See (Winsberg [2012], pp. 401-2). 
49
 (Winsberg [2012], p. 402). 
50
 This second criticism applies to the CC-M, but not the 
M
CC-M, since if the entire background space is de 
Sitter, there are no arrows of time. 
51
 (Nikolić [2008], p. 2). See also (Vilenkin [2013a], p. 21). Vilenkin ([2013b], pp. 20-21) admitted,  
“A generic spacelike hypersurface in this kind of spacetime will itself run into singularities, so an 
infinite regular Cauchy surface appears to be rather special. Note, by the way, that if one is willing 
to accept a spacetime besieged by singularities, then the assumption of an infinite Cauchy surface 
does not seem to be essential. A large compact Cauchy surface with generic initial data will also 
yield some inflating regions surrounded by singularities.”  
Vilenkin ([2013b], p. 21) also takes issue with C&C’s insistence that the initial Cauchy hypersurface is 
generic. His worry is related to the question of whether or not, on the supposition that entropy is unbounded, any one 
state can truly be typical or generic. He said, “[i]f indeed the entropy of the universe is unbounded from above, then 
there is no such thing as a generic (or random, or typical) state.” ([ibid.]) 
Putting worries about the initial time surface aside, I would like to add that it is difficult to make sense of 
the claim that any one unique set of states are generic since on C&C’s view, everything that physically can happen, 
happens an infinite amount of times (see sect. 5.4 for more on this idea). 
52
 Aguirre, (Sean) Carroll, and Johnson ([2011], pp. 22-3) provide a very detailed study of fluctuations and 
universe nucleation. They put pressure on recommended strategies for resolving likelihood worries akin to the 
Boltzmann Brain paradox which concern technical details about generating inflation “from a non-inflating phase” 
([ibid.], p. 22). In the process of applying that pressure, they briefly describe one would-be escape. The authors 
intimate that the escape probably necessitates that observers cannot enter “the new inflating region….because the 
nucleated bubble is separated from the parent spacetime by a wormhole”; they state that “this is the Farhi-Guth-
Guven process [74]” (Aguirre, Carroll, and Johnson [2011], p. 23). The authors go on to cite (Carroll and Chen 
[2004]), successfully associating that work with the quantum tunneling approach. 
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In our discussion is that we [sic] examine the case of an harmonic oscillator 
potential without any false vacua; in such a potential we can simply fluctuate up 
without any tunneling. The resulting period of inflation can then end via 
conventional slow-roll, which is more phenomenologically acceptable than 
tunneling from a false vacuum (as in “old inflation” [7]). Thus, the emptying-out 
of the universe under typical evolution of a generic state can actually provide 
appropriate initial conditions for the onset of inflation, which then leads to regions 
that look like our universe.
53
 
 
But C&C ([2004], pp. 22-23; pp. 25-26; cf. n. 4 on p. 26) concede that the fluctuation route to 
metagalaxy nucleation and large-scale structure formation is incredibly improbable.  
I described the incompleteness of the model as “admitted incompleteness” because 
Carroll himself (with collaborators Aguirre and Johnson [2011], pp. 23-24) criticized the FGG 
mechanism for universe nucleation confessing (independently) in a different place that that 
mechanism is “extremely speculative”.54 
In other work, Carroll indicated that the multiverse is a prediction of string theory and 
inflation.
55
 His optimism concerning string theory is somewhat surprising since “...there is 
presently no fully satisfactory embedding of de Sitter space into string theory”56, and “[a]ll 
explicit and fully trustworthy solutions that have ever been constructed in string theory have a 
non-positive cosmological constant.”57 Andrew Strominger elaborated on this point: 
 
An obvious approach, successfuly [sic] employed in the black hole case, would be 
to begin by embedding de Sitter space as a solution of string theory, and then 
exploit various string dualities to obtain a microscopic description. Unfortunately 
                                                             
53
 (Carroll and Chen [2004], p. 21 emphasis mine). FGG essentially involves false vacua. Moreover, the 
mechanism of (Garriga and Vilenkin [1998], also involve false vacua (Vilenkin [2013b], p. 12)). 
54
 (Carroll [2006], p. 1133). It is important to remember how tentative the conclusions of Farhi, Guth, and 
Guven were. Recall their remarks at the end of the paper: 
“The inflationary universe model proposes that our universe grew from a tiny inflating 
region of false vacuum. We know, however, that the laws of classical general relativity 
imply that a bubble that grows large enough to become a new universe cannot be 
produced without an initial singularity. In this paper we have asked whether this 
requirement can be avoided by quantum tunneling. Unfortunately we do not have a 
definitive answer to this question, but we have obtained an expression for the tunneling 
amplitude that seems highly plausible, and we conjecture that it is a valid 
approximation.” (Farhi, Guth, and Guven [1990], p. 472 emphasis mine; cf. p. 473) 
55
 See (Carroll [2012]). See also his comments in (Carroll [2006], p. 1133), and the favorable attitude about 
string theory in his ([2010], pp. 284-6 “The leading candidate for a consistent quantum theory of gravity is string 
theory” ([ibid.], p. 284 emphasis in the original)). See Smolin ([2004]) for an evaluation of the merits of string 
theory over against loop quantum gravity (see particularly [2004], p. 521). I am a string theory skeptic who agreed 
with Tom Banks ([2007], p. 3) when he wrote that “[t]he Landscape…does not really give an explanation of how the 
universe gets into the low entropy state from which it tunnels into the basin of attraction in which we find 
ourselves.” 
56
 (Bousso, DeWolfe, and Myers [2003], p. 297-8). There are no-go theorems which seek to establish that 
certain compactified theories (string theories) are incompatible with de Sitter space-time (see Maldacena and Nuñez 
[2000], pp. 26-27). 
57
 (Van Riet [2011], p. 2). 
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persistent efforts by many (mostly unpublished!) have so far failed even to find a 
fully satisfactory de Sitter solution of string theory.
58
 
 
Captivatingly, Carroll (with Johnson, and Randall) seems to agree, “…string theory…seems to 
favor Minkowski or anti-de Sitter vacua.”59  
 There are further problems with injecting string theory into the model, for that theory 
requires a great many dimensions which must somehow be compactified into any pure or 
asymptotically de Sitter space if one or the other is your space of choice. The problem is that 
there are no-go theorems proving that compactified theories which abide by the null energy 
condition (along with several other plausible conditions for string theoretic models) cannot be 
wed to inflationary theory.
60
 It has also been shown that compactified theories which violate the 
null energy condition, but which otherwise satisfy other very plausible conditions (for string 
theoretic models) cannot be united with inflationary theory or theories.
61
 So I’m not sure what to 
make of Carroll’s claim that a multiverse is a prediction of inflation coupled with string theory. 
The two are not agreeable partners.
62
  
The foregoing reasoning indicates that FGG nucleation out of a de Sitter space-time is 
merely speculative and that Carroll’s discussion of it should be thought of as exploratory. I 
believe it is therefore safe to conclude that a central piece of the model is missing, and so the 
CC-M is incomplete in that it does not have a clear recommended dynamical path from the 
background Universe to the birth of metagalaxies like ours (q.v. note 41). 
The incompleteness of the CC-M has a bearing on the question of whether or not the 
model provides a bona fide scientific explanation of our initial low-entropy state. Assuming 
some robust version of scientific realism, explanations, when they successfully explain, are at 
least approximately true. It is not clear how an explanans can be verisimilar, if it is unclear 
which proposition, if any, is expressed by that explanans on account of the kind of 
incompleteness the CC-M displays. Thus, I find this gap in the model to be severely delimiting. 
We cannot, in my opinion, justifiably claim that the CC-M proffers an actual scientific 
explanation of the initial non-empty smoothness of our metagalaxy, since it is altogether unclear 
what the explanation is on the CC-M. 
                                                             
58
 (Stominger [2001], p. 2). In fact, Stominger takes himself to be working in the context of a state of the art 
that is without “a stringy example of de Sitter space.” ([ibid.]) 
59
 (Carroll, Johnson, and Randall [2009], p. 2). As the quotation from van Reit would seem to suggest, the 
supposition that string theory does not get along well with a pure de Sitter space-time may be related to the problem 
of the compatibility of string theory and space-times with a positive cosmological constant (the real presence of dark 
vacuum energy). On this issue Peebles and Ratra expressed an interesting thought,  
“Building on earlier work,119 and Hellerman, Kaloper, and Susskind (2001) and Fischler 
et al. (2001) noted that dark-energy scalar field cosmological models have future event 
horizons characteristic of the de Sitter model. This means some events have causal 
futures that do not share any common events. In these dark-energy scalar field models, 
some correlations are therefore unmeasurable, which destroys the observational meaning 
of the S matrix. This indicates that it is not straightforward to bring superstring/M theory 
into consistency with dark-energy models in which the expansion of the universe is 
accelerating.” (Peebles and Ratra [2003], pp. 598-9 empahsis mine) 
60
 I have in mind the results of Steinhardt and Wesley ([2009], pp. 104026-4 to 104026-6). Though cf. 
Koster and Postma ([2011]). 
61
 Steinhardt and Wesley ([2009], pp. 104026-6 to 104026-8). 
62
 See also Hertzberg et. al. ([2007]). They argue that inflationary theory will not run with the most 
intimately understood and perhaps most realistic compactifications of the string theoretic type IIA sort. 
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4 Unbounded Entropy?63 
 
Having argued that C&C’s proposed scientific explanation of our initial low-entropy state 
is incomplete, I now want to give attention to that explanation on the assumption that it is or can 
be completed. In this section, I take up claim (3). I maintain that the N-bound confirms the Tom 
Banks/Willy Fischler -Ncorrespondence thesis, at least when the background space of the 
M
CC-M is in view, and that such confirmation means that claim (3) is false. I also argue that 
while it is unclear if the N-bound holds for the background space of the CC-M, there are 
arguments to which one can turn for the purposes of establishing -Ncorrespondence for that 
space, and so claim (3) is false given the CC-M. 
 
4.1 Λ-N Correspondence 
 
Tom Banks has argued that the value of , the cosmological constant, is the inverse of 
the value of N.
64
 N is the logarithm of the dimension of Hilbert space in quantum theory. By 
consequence, if one’s quantum theory conceives of N as finite, then that quantum theory will 
contain finitely many dimensions.
65
 The correspondence of to N entails that there is a large 
(though finite) number of degrees of freedom.
66
 If, however, N really is finite, then quantum 
theories of gravity featuring infinitely many degrees of freedom will be implausible. 
 
4.2 Confirmation of Λ-N Correspondence 
 
Raphael Bousso has noted that proofs of what he calls the “N-bound” constitute evidence 
for -N correspondence.67 The N-bound states that every space-time with  > 0 is a space-time 
whose total observable entropy is bounded by:  
 
 (5): N = 
  
 
        (Eq. 2)
68
 
 
Or, any space-time with a positive cosmological constant is one which cannot feature an 
observable entropy whose value is greater than N = 3/.69 The N-bound trivially holds for 
empty de Sitter space-times like the background space of the 
M
CC-M. In addition, Bousso at one 
                                                             
63
 In this section, I use Planck units, and work with only four dimensions of space-time. 
64
 See (Banks [2000], p. 5). He proffered three arguments for the view, though he was concerned with 
establishing the correspondence for asymptotically de Sitter space-times solely). For details regarding 
asymptotically de Sitter space-times see (Gibbons and Hawking [1977]).  
65
 (Bousso [2000a], p. 2. n. 2). 
66
 (Bousso [2000a], p. 2). 
67
 His argument is explanatoral: “It is hard to see what, other than the -N correspondence, would offer a 
compelling explanation [of] why such disparate elements appear to join seamlessly to imply a simple and general 
result” (Bousso [2000a], p. 18). 
68
 (Bousso [2000a], p. 3). The type of entropy in play appears to be information-theoretic or Von Neumann 
entropy. This fact is irrelevant. The main argument of sect. 4.3 still runs. 
69
 (Bousso [2000a], p. 2). In subsequent discussion, I will sometimes speak of N-bound validity for a space-
time. What I mean by such a judgment is that Eq.2 (proposition 5) holds for those space-times. 
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time believed that one could show that the N-bound is valid for asymptotically de Sitter space-
times—such as our metagalaxy—on the basis of the generalized second law.70  
Bousso attempted to establish the N-bound by connecting two further entropy bounds, 
viz., the D-bound, and covariant entropy bound.
71
 The covariant entropy bound—developed for 
the purposes of helping along supporting argumentation for the holographic principle—is a 
bound on light-sheets or null hypersurfaces.
72
 C&C believe that the covariant bound is implied 
by the holographic principle, and at least Carroll takes that principle seriously.
73
 I will therefore 
omit an articulation of the supporting arguments for the covariant bound.  
In order to understand the nature of the D-bound, several important notions in the 
literature on entropy require introduction. Many of these notions receive clarification and sound 
scientific study in the work of Jacob D. Bekenstein, who discovered that the total entropy of an 
asymptotically flat space is equivalent to the sum of the Bekenstein-Hawking entropy Sh, and the 
matter entropy Sm of the space.
74
 I should add (following Gibbons and Hawking [1977] and 
Bousso [2000a, p. 11-2]) that one should include the cosmological horizon entropy Sc—which, 
as it turns out, in an empty de Sitter space is just equivalent to N —in calculating the total 
entropy of an AsDS space-time. Now, the Bekenstein-Hawking entropy is black hole entropy. 
Cosmological horizon entropy is simply (and tautologically) the entropy of a cosmological 
horizon.
75
 And matter entropy is the entropy of material bodies. 
The notions appealed to for my statement of Bekenstein’s discovery are just some of the 
prerequisite notions needed to understand the D-bound, for that bound also appeals to the 
generalized second law (GSL). The GSL states (roughly) that the total entropy of a system 
(which includes black-hole entropy) never decreases as time marches onward.
76
 And so, with 
respect to an AsDS space, and the total cosmological horizon entropy Sc, and matter entropy Sm 
of a system of that space, the GSL entails that the total cosmological horizon entropy of that 
                                                             
70
 Bousso ([2000a], p. 2) remarked: 
“It is not difficult to see that the N-bound is true for vacuum solutions like de Sitter space 
(a trivial case). Moreover, one can argue that it is satisfied for all space-times which are 
asymptotically de Sitter at late times, by the generalized second law of thermodynamics.” 
I provide a definition of the generalized second law in sect. 4.3 below. 
 As recently as 2012, Bousso ([2012], p. 29) confessed that “[t]he entropy bound in the corresponding de 
Sitter space is 3/....” This more current admission is important since it implies that his later change of mind 
regarding N-bound validity for all de Sitter space-times whether dS or AsDS, did not affect his belief that the N-
bound holds for empty or pure dS space-times. 
71
 (Bousso [2000a], p. 13). Bousso’s proof of the N-bound also involves the notion of a causal diamond (for 
which see (Bousso [2000a], pp. 4-9)).  
72
 (Bousso [2000a], p. 9; cf. Bousso [1999a], [2000a, pp. 10-1]; t’ Hooft [2009]; and Susskind [1995]). 
C&C show a certain respect for the covariant bound, in that they finesse their model so as not to violate it (see the 
comments in (Carroll and Chen [2004], pp. 14-5)). Banks ([2007], p. 19) notes that you can prove the covariant 
entropy bound “from Einstein’s equations with additional assumptions bounding entropy density by energy density” 
73
 “A concrete consequence of the holographic principle is Bousso’s covariant entropy bound, which places 
a limit on the entropy that can be contained within a region [63].” (Carroll and Chen [2004], p. 14) With respect to 
Carroll’s attitude concerning the holographic principle, see (Carroll [2010], pp. 278-81). For more on the 
holographic principle, see (Bousso [2000b]). For discussion of holographic cosmology, see (Banks [2010], pp. 4875-
7; Banks and Fischler [2001]; and Fischler and Susskind [1998]). 
74
 (Bousso [2000a], pp. 11-2; and for background see Bekenstein [1972], [1973], [1974] following 
Bousso’s source trail).  
75
 What’s a cosmological horizon? It’s the horizon of a postulated observer. Cosmological horizons are 
sometimes called particle horizons. 
76
 See (Wall [2009], p. 2). 
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system will be greater than or equal to the matter entropy of the system (where black hole 
entropy is accounted for in the matter entropy).
77
 Thus,        .
78
 The D-bound then, is a 
bound on matter entropy which marks the “[d]ifference between N and the horizon entropy” of a 
system.
79
  
Given the above details, Bousso’s ([2000a]) proof of the D-bound is as follows: Suppose 
there is a system of matter  situated in an asymptotically de Sitter space-time that is enveloped 
within the area of a cosmological horizon Ac. Suppose further that  is headed—evolution-
wise—to an empty de Sitter state. If we posit the existence of a hypothetical observer within our 
assumed matter system, the evolution of  toward an empty de Sitter space-time can be 
illustrated by simply noting that the observer will be moved, as the evolution of the system 
marches forward, into the asymptotic region (the de Sitter region). Eventually our hypothetical 
observer will start to think that is moving into the cosmological horizon, and as  evolves in 
this way, Sm will vanish, though the cosmological horizon entropy will be enlarged by the 
following quantity
80
: 
 
(6):      
 
 
(       )      (Eq. 3)
81
 
 
But now—Bousso insists—it will follow, given A0 = 4N, that there is a bound on Sm, viz., the D-
bound: 
 
 (D-Bound): Sm     
 
 
        (Eq. 4)
82
 
 
With the D-bound and covariant bound in his back pocket, Bousso only needed a little more 
equipment (i.e., two fairly non-contentious results regarding causal diamonds
83
) to prove that the 
N-bound is valid for all space-times with a positive cosmological constant.
84
 
 The tools in Bousso’s back pocket are only needed for generalizing Bousso’s proof of the 
N-bound to all space-times with a positive cosmological constant.
85
 Lee Smolin ([2002, p. 45]) 
articulated a straightforward proof of the validity of the N-bound for empty de Sitter space-times, 
                                                             
77
 Following (Bousso [2000a], p. 12). 
78
 Following (Bousso [2000a], pp. 12-3). 
79
 (Bousso [2000a], p. 13). This bound is obviously only relevant when non-empty de Sitter space-times are 
in view. 
80
 Again, the argument here is from (Bousso [2000a], p. 12) 
81
 (Bousso [2000a], p. 12). 
82
 (Bousso [2000a], p. 12). Bousso in [ibid.], p. 18, and in [2001] noted that the D-bound is akin to the 
Bekenstein bound for which see Bekenstein ([1981]). 
83
 See (Bousso [2000a], pp. 5-9). 
84
 For the proof see (Bousso [2000a], pp. 13-7). 
85
 I am unsure of whether or not the N-bound is valid for all space-times with a positive cosmological 
constant. Indeed, Bousso himself (with collaborators) provides counter-examples to the N-bound (see Bousso, 
DeWolfe, and Myers [2003]). These counter-examples involve space-times with dimensionality greater than four. 
Clarkson, Ghezelbash, and Mann ([2003]) attempted to show that the N-bound is not valid for a four-dimensional 
Taub-Bold space-time. The Taub-Bold space-time they had in mind is locally asymptotically de Sitter, and it 
features NUT charge (magnetic mass), and (unfortunately) closed timelike curves ([ibid.], pp. 360-1). This does not 
appear to be the background space-time of the 
M
CC-M or CC-M. With respect to N-bound validity, the only point 
that my argumentation requires is that the N-bound is valid for dS or empty de Sitter space-time, and both Bousso 
([2000a], [2012]) and Smolin ([2002]) have acknowledged its validity in that context. 
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which required only the Bekenstein bound.
86
 Moreover, he derives the N-bound from 
implications of loop quantum gravity in (Smolin [2002], pp. 45-46). This latter result is evidence 
that the N-bound is valid for empty de Sitter space in light of a possible, though in some ways 
still incomplete, fundamental theory of gravity.
87
 
 
4.3 The N-Bound and the MCC-M  
 
 How does all of this relate to the 
M
CC-M? Recall proposition (3) above, and remember 
that if (3) holds, then there are infinitely many degrees of freedom.
88
 The N-bound, which is 
trivially valid for empty de Sitter space (the very background space of 
M
CC-M) is strong 
confirming evidence for the Banks/Fischler -N correspondence thesis (as Bousso suggested). 
But educe from your memory the fact that N comports to the logarithm of the dimension of the 
Hilbert space in quantum theory. If the correspondence thesis is right, then N is probably finite. 
Therefore, there should be finitely many dimensions of Hilbert space in the correct quantum 
theory, and so there are also only finitely many degrees of freedom. This conclusion ensures that 
(3) is false. Entropy is not unbounded from above.
89
 The argument in play can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
(Premise 1): If the /N correspondence thesis holds for dS space-time, then the correct 
quantum theory describing that space-time will feature a finitely 
dimensional Hilbert space. 
(Premise 2): If the N-bound is valid for dS space-time, and the best explanation of N-
bound validity for dS space-time is the /N correspondence thesis, then the 
/N correspondence thesis holds for dS space-time. 
(Premise 3): The N-bound is valid for dS space-time, and the best explanation of N-bound 
validity for dS space-time is the /N correspondence thesis. 
                                                             
86
 See (Pesci [2010]) for an argument from holography for the Bekenstein bound. In addition, Smolin 
([2002], p. 45) states that the N-bound is valid “[f]or a semiclassical quantum field theory in deSitter spacetime” 
given only “Bousso’s form of the holographic bound”.  
87
 I do not mean to suggest that loop quantum gravity is the correct complete theory of quantum gravity. 
Nor do I mean to suggest that loop quantum cosmology provides approximately true models of the cosmos. My 
point is simply that loop quantum gravity is at least a potential approximation of what a complete quantum gravity 
will look like, and since it implies that the N-bound is valid for empty de Sitter space, we have some evidence that 
such validity will hold in light of quantum gravity. 
88
 C&C’s commitment to the thesis that there are infinitely many degrees of freedom and that this thesis is 
connected to (3) is clear. They stated: 
“…there is one loophole in this reasoning, namely the assumption that there is such a 
thing as a state of maximal entropy. If the universe truly has an infinite number of 
degrees of freedom, and can evolve in a direction of increasing entropy from any 
specified state, then an explanation for the observed arrow of time arises more naturally.” 
(Carroll and Chen [2004], p. 7; cf. pp. 14-5, and p. 30. In fact on page 15 they state that it 
is an assumption of the portion of their paper where the model is articulated that there are 
an infinite amount of degrees of freedom.) 
89
 Notice that the argument is not the claim that (3) is false because there is a bound which bounds the 
entropy of C&C’s background space. I should add that in (Aguirre, Carroll, and Johnson [2011], p. 10) it is admitted 
that “the fundamental degrees of freedom underlying dS space are unknown.” They also claim that 
“[c]omplementarity plus the bound on the information accessible to any one observer…implies that dS can be 
described by a theory with a finite number of degrees of freedom…” ([ibid.]) 
Christopher Gregory Weaver 
On the Carroll-Chen Model 
16 
 
Page 16 of 42 
 
(Premise 4): If the correct quantum theory for an empty dS space-time features a finitely 
dimensional Hilbert space, then dS space-time features only finitely many 
degrees of freedom. 
(Premise 5): If dS space-time features only finitely many degrees of freedom, then the 
global entropy of dS space-time cannot be unbounded from above. 
(Conclusion): Therefore, the global entropy of dS space-time cannot be unbounded from 
above. 
 
 The first premise is true by virtue of the meaning of the correspondence thesis. The 
second premise holds on account of the cogency of inference to the best explanation reasoning. 
In the absence of defeaters and underdetermination, such reasoning provides cognizers with 
epistemic justification for their belief that the purported best explanation holds.
90
 The first 
conjunct of premise three follows from the insights and considerations of sect. 4.2. The second 
conjunct follows from the fact that there is simply no competing explanation of the relating of 
the two seemingly incommensurable parameters, viz.  and N (q.v., note 67). It seems that the 
correspondence thesis wins by default. Premises four and five seem straightforward enough, and 
our conclusion follows from elementary moves in propositional logic. 
In an attempt to defend the 
M
CC-M, one might respond by emphasizing the fact that the 
means by which the Universe increases its entropy is by giving birth to metagalaxies (q.v., note 
39).
91
 Appeals to the N-bound do nothing to subvert that possibility. This response is flawed. 
According to C&C, if it is not the case that there are infinitely many degrees of freedom, then 
their story regarding universe nucleation and unbounded entropy cannot run. Entropy is 
unbounded from above only if there are infinitely many degrees of freedom. The above 
argumentation cuts down this necessary condition, and so results in a bound on entropy. 
Again the argument from the N-bound shows that with respect to the background de 
Sitter space-time of the 
M
CC-M, there are finitely many degrees of freedom. Carroll himself 
believes that the 
M
CC-M would in that case have a fundamental problem with Poincaré 
recurrence.
92
 Recall that on the basis of Newtonian mechanical laws of motion, and with respect 
to an energetically isolated system whose volume is finite, Poincaré proved an important 
theorem. The result is this: given the aforementioned assumptions, a relevant system which starts 
off in state s at t, will, given enough time, evolve back into a state arbitrarily close to s, and it 
will do this infinitely many times.
93
 There are quantum analogs of this theorem,
94
 and Carroll 
believes he can escape these analogs by appeal to an infinitely dimensional Hilbert space.
95
 But 
                                                             
90
 The use of this type of explanatoral reasoning for the purposes of establishing the Banks/Fischler 
correspondence thesis was used by Bousso (q.v., note 67). 
91
 (Carroll [2010], pp. 359-360). 
92
 See (Carroll [2008b], pp. 6-7) 
93
 I’m relying upon and paraphrasing the discussion in (Sklar [1993], p. 36). Poincaré stated, “[a]ny phase-
space configuration (q, p) of a system enclosed in a finite volume will be repeated as accurately as one wishes after a 
finite (be it possibly very long) interval of time.” as quoted by (Bocchieri and Loinger [1957], p. 337). 
94
 Dyson, Kleban, and Susskind ([2002], p. 17) put the quantum version this way:  
“The quantum Poincaré Recurrence theorem…can be stated as follows: given a system in 
which all energy eigenvalues are discrete, a state will return arbitrarily close to its initial 
value in a finite amount of time. It follows immediately that expectation values of 
observables will also return arbitrarily close to their original values.” 
See also Bocchieri and Loinger ([1957]); Duvenhage ([2002], pp. 53-60); Schulman ([1978]); cf. the discussion in 
Percival ([1961]). 
95
 See (Carroll [2008b], pp. 6-7). 
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you will remember that the argument from the N-bound cuts down the dimensions of Hilbert 
space to only a finite amount due to the Banks/Fischler -N correspondence thesis. Thus, by 
Carroll’s own lights, the problem of Poincaré recurrence remains. 
Let me now grant, for the sake of argument, that the entropy increase through universe 
nucleation-response muzzles the argument from the N-bound; there still remains an 
insurmountable problem. Carroll understands metagalaxies to be autonomous independent space-
times. Respective proto-inflationary patches (those patches that produce the large-scale structure 
of metagalaxies like ours) do relate in some—heretofore unknown—causal way to prior 
fluctuations or tunneling in/from the background space. In addition, the metagalaxy evolves 
unitarily as an isolated causally disconnected metagalaxy. I am afraid that I do not understand 
what it means to say that the entropy of the Universe increases “in time” (which time we do not 
know) as the entropy of the causally independent and autonomous space-time that is a 
metagalaxy increases. My worry here is not about the problem of time and nucleation (discussed 
in sect. 3), but about the following peculiar relationship: as entropy increases in an independent 
and autonomous metagalaxy m, entropy increases in the background mother Universe. I do not 
believe, therefore, that what Carroll has “done is given the [U]niverse a way that it can increase 
its entropy without limit.”96 
4.4 The N-Bound and the CC-M  
 
Does the argument from the N-bound apply equally well to the background space-time of 
the CC-M? I am not sure. C&C’s description of that space is fragmented. We do not know the 
dimensionality of the space, nor what generic conditions the space evolves away from. In 
addition, we do not know what precise kinds of matter occupy the space in its non-de Sitter 
regions. Ignorance of these matters makes it difficult to determine N-bound validity, for although 
Bousso ([2000a]) originally argued that the N-bound is valid for all space-times with a positive 
cosmological constant, he would later (with collaborators) reverse his opinion on the matter by 
proffering counter-examples to his original proof. These counter-examples all come from space-
times with dimensionality greater than four, and from space-times which violate a particular 
“assumption of spherical symmetry.”97 But let us suppose that the N-bound is not valid for the 
background space of the CC-M. Tom Banks ([2000], pp. 5-6) provided three convincing 
arguments all demonstrating that the -N correspondence thesis holds for AsDS space-times. 
From the little we can discern about the nature of the background space of the CC-M, we can 
somewhat safely infer that that space is AsDS. Hence, the Hilbert space of the appropriate 
quantum theory describing that space-time is finitely dimensional. Claim (3) is therefore false 
when either the CC-M or 
M
CC-M is in view.  
I will now continue to assume that the CC-M/
M
CC-M
98
 is complete, and move on and 
reflect, in the next section, on claim (2), evaluating the proposed mechanisms for universe 
nucleation in the work of C&C. 
 
 
                                                             
96
 (Carroll [2010], p. 259). 
97
 (Bousso, DeWolfe, and Myers [2003], p. 299). Q.v. note 85 
98
 Throughout the remainder of the paper, one may read ‘MCC-M’ wherever one sees ‘CC-M’. All 
subsequent argumentation will be applicable to both. 
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5 Nucleation and Metagalaxy Creation 
 
As I have already pointed out, Carroll seems to commit himself to the quantum tunneling 
process of universe nucleation as articulated by FGG ([1990]).
99
 That process will not serve as a 
proper mechanism for the nucleation of our metagalaxy, if our metagalaxy has an initial 
singularity. On this point FGG stated, “…any plausible scheme to create a universe in the 
laboratory must avoid an initial singularity.”100 As a result, FGG try to articulate a theory of 
quantum tunneling which avoids the Penrose singularity theorem of ([1965]). I will argue that 
while the FGG model may escape the Penrose theorem, it does not escape other theorems which 
entail that our metagalaxy has an initial singularity, and that our metagalaxy is past-geodesically 
incomplete. 
 
5.1 The EGS Theorem and Related Results 
 
According to the EGS theorem (proven in Ehlers, Geren, and Sachs ([1968])), given the 
Copernican principle
101
, and that observers situated in some expanding model discern (via 
observations) that free and unrestrained “propagating background radiation is” isotropic, the 
space-time in which such observers are situated must be FLRW.
102
 Clifton, Clarkson, and Bull 
([2012]) (CCB) showed that space-time geometry is, for an observer, FLRW “using the CMB 
alone” without the Copernican principle.103 Their proof also indicates that “our entire causal past 
must…be FLRW.”104 One acquires their results by assuming that an observer beholds isotropic 
cosmic microwave background radiation while the Sunyaev-Zel’dovich effect ((SZ) which 
involves baryonic matter scattering the photons of the CMBR
105
) is present in that beholding.
106
 
The idea is that if a single onlooker observes blackbody CMBR that is isotropic, and that CMBR 
is accompanied by particular SZ-related scattering events, then that observer can infer that her 
universe is FLRW, given that the necessary assumptions of the EGS theorem (save the 
Copernican principle) hold, and that either (a) the observer’s observations are over a prolonged 
period of time, or (b) the SZ-related effects involve double scattering.
107
 I should add that the 
                                                             
99
 Again, see (Carroll [2008b], p. 8, [2010], pp. 356-9, and Aguirre, Carroll, and Johnson [2011], pp. 22-3). 
100
 (Farhi, Guth, and Guven [1990], p. 419). Farhi and Guth ([1987], p. 149 stated, “[t]he requirement of an 
initial singularity appears to be an insurmountable obstacle to the creation of an inflationary universe in the 
laboratory.”) 
101
 The Copernican principle says, roughly, that our causal past and position in space-time is not unique or 
distinctive. (Stoeger, Maartens, and Ellis [1995], p. 1). 
102
 Borrowing some wording from Smeenck ([2013], pp. 630-1). See also (Stoeger, Maartens, and Ellis 
[1995], p. 1). There is a nice discussion of these matters in (Clarkson and Maartens [2010]; Maartens [2011]; and 
Weinberg [1972], pp. 395-403, cf. [2008], p. 3). It is important to add that the result from Ehlers, Geren, and Sachs 
does not extend to times prior to the decoupling era. ([1968], p. 1349 “the result presented cannot be taken to mean 
that the universe in its earliest stages was necessarily a Friedmann model…” emphasis mine) 
103
 (Clifton, Clarkson, and Bull ([2012], p. 051303-4). 
104
 (Clifton, Clarkson, and Bull ([2012], p. 051303-3) emphasis mine. 
105
 (Clarkson [2012], p. 19). 
106
 (Clifton, Clarkson, and Bull [2012], pp. 051303-1 to 051303-2). For more on the Sunyaev-Zel’dovich 
effect see (Weinberg [2008], pp. 132-5). 
107
 I’m paraphrasing Clarkson’s review of the CCB result in (Clarkson [2012], p. 19). 
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CCB results hold even given the presence of dark energy, it is just that such dark energy must be 
susceptible to a scalar field description.
108
  
Both the EGS and CCB results are significant since our observations regarding the 
cosmic microwave background radiation suggest that that blackbody radiation is nearly 
isotropic.
109
 The qualifier ‘nearly’ is important since it seems that both EGS and CCB reasoning 
require highly idealized propagating radiation in so far as that radiation must be exactly 
isotropic.
110
 Our metagalaxy’s CMBR exhibits certain anisotropies111, and so it is unclear what 
work these theorems can do for me.
112
  
There are related results which do not rely on a condition of perfectly isotropic CMBR. 
One attempt to stabilize the EGS theorem in light of the inexact isotropy of the CMBR comes to 
us from the work of Stoeger, Maartens, and Ellis ([1995]).
113
 They argued that our cosmos is 
approximately or nearly FLRW given the Copernican principle, the fact that background 
blackbody radiation is freely propagating everywhere and that such radiation is perceived, by 
observers, to be approximately or nearly isotropic (plus a few additional technical 
assumptions).
114
 Maartens and Matravers ([1994]) have articulated a matter analog of the EGS 
theorem. Their result establishes that our universe is FLRW given the Copernican principle, and 
that a class of galactic observations along a postulated observer’s world line is isotropic.115  
The most formidable EGS-like result was recently discussed by Roy Maartens ([2011], 
pp. 5121-5) in his excellent review of much of the associated literature.
116
 The theorem has it that 
with respect to a region of a space-time featuring dark energy (whether understood in terms of a 
                                                             
108
 It may be that in order to alleviate worries about fine-tuning and the cosmological constant, one should 
appropriate a scalar field model of dark energy. In addition, it seems that the best way of understanding dark energy 
via quintessence is to posit a scalar field model of dark energy. As Weinberg remarked, “[t]he natural way to 
introduce a varying vacuum energy is to assume the existence of one or more scalar fields, on which the vacuum 
energy depends, and whose cosmic expectation values change with time.” (Weinberg [2008], p. 89) For more on 
dark energy and scalar field models of such energy, see (Sahni [2002], pp. 3439-41). 
109
 Clarkson and Maartens ([2010], p. 2) stated,  
“Isotropy is directly observable in principle, and indeed we have excellent data to show that the 
CMB is isotropic about us to within one part in ~ 10
5
 (once the dipole is interpreted as due to our 
motion relative to the cosmic frame, and removed by a boost).” 
Weinberg ([2008], p. 129) confesses that treating the CMBR as perfectly isotropic and homogeneous is “a good 
approximation”. He says that “the one thing that enabled Penzias and Wilson to distinguish the background radiation 
from radiation emitted by earth’s atmosphere was that the microwave background did not seem to vary with 
direction in the sky.” ([ibid.]) 
110
 Clifton, Clarkson, and Bull admit to their idealized assumptions in (Clifton, Clarkson, and Bull [2012], 
p. 051303-4]). 
111
 See (Hawking and Ellis [1973], pp. 353-4). For a discussion of the CMBR anisotropies, see (Lyth and 
Liddle [2009], pp. 152-69; and Weinberg [2008], pp. 129-48). 
112
 Ehlers, Geren, and Sachs ([1968]) also ignored the cosmological constant. 
113
 See also the discussion in (Peebles [1993]). 
114
 Technically the result is that: 
 “if the Einstein-Liouville equations are satisfied in an expanding universe, where there is present 
pressure-free matter with 4-velocity vector field u
a
 (uau
a
 = – 1) such that (freely propagating) 
background radiation is everywhere almost-isotropic relative to u
a
, then spacetime is almost 
FLRW.” (Stoeger, Maartens, and Ellis [1995], p. 1 emphasis in the original) 
115
 These galactic observations correspond to propositions (O1)-(O4) in (Maartens and Matravers [1994], p. 
2694). They are not observations of isotropic background blackbody radiation. See also (Maartens [2011]; and cf. 
Hasse and Perlick [1999]). 
116
 His discussion of the specific result I am interested in is an expansion on his earlier work with Chris 
Clarkson in (Clarkson and Maartens [2010]). 
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perfect fluid, quintessence, or cosmological constant) and dust matter, if (a) the Copernican 
principle holds, (b) the observed CMBR “rest frame is geodesic”117 with an expanding four-
velocity, and (c) the self-same radiation is collisionless with a vanishing octupole, quadrupole 
and dipole
118
, then the metric of the relevant spacetime is FLRW.
119
 The assumptions of this 
theorem are quite weak. I therefore agree with Maartens “[t]his is the most powerful 
observational basis that we have for background homogeneity and thus an FLRW background 
model.”120 
What is the relevance of all of this to the CC-M? It turns out that every FLRW model 
(with matter like ours) features an initial singularity.
121
 And since the assumptions of several of 
the EGS-like results are quite weak, we are justified in maintaining that our metagalaxy is best 
described by an FLRW model.
122
 Thus, the FGG mechanism for metagalaxy nucleation cannot 
be the mechanism responsible for our universe’s nucleation out of a background de Sitter space. 
Some other theory of nucleation that is not impeded by the singular nature of our metagalaxy is 
required. 
5.2 The BGV Theorem 
 
On the standard hot big bang model, implications of proper solutions to Einstein’s field 
equations imply that our metagalaxy is geodesically incomplete in that our metagalaxy features 
an initial singularity. Attempts to avoid this implication were blocked by work on singularity 
theorems in the 1960s and 1970s. For example, Robert Geroch ([1966]), Stephen Hawking 
([1965], [1966a], [1966b], [1967]) and Roger Penrose ([1965]) showed that any time-oriented 
space-time which satisfies modest conditions will be time-like or null geodesically incomplete.
123
 
In ([1970]) Hawking and Penrose attempted to generalize on this work by advancing “[a] new 
theorem on space-time singularities”.124 Hawking would later describe this newer theorem as one 
which predicts that there are singularities in the future, and that there is a singularity in the past 
“at the beginning of the present expansion of the universe.”125 The theorem had need of four 
                                                             
117
 (Maartens [2011], p. 5131]). 
118 Such that F = F= F = 0 holds (from equation 3.24 of Maartens [2011], p. 5125). 
119
 See (Maartens [2011], p. 5125, p. 5131). 
120
 (Maartens [2011], p. 5125). 
121
 “FLRW models with ordinary matter have a singularity at a finite time in the past.” (Smeenk [2013], p. 
612). Hawking and Ellis stated, “…there are singularities in any Roberston-Walker space-time in which  > 0, p ≥ 0 
and is not too large.” (Hawking and Ellis [1973], p. 142). See also (Wald [1984], pp. 213-4); and the discussion of 
FLRW models in (Penrose [2005], pp. 717-23). Subsequent to illustrating the class of FLRW models via Fig. 27.13, 
Penrose wrote,  
“Friedmann-Lemaitre-Roberston-Walker (FLRW) [are] spatially homogenous and 
isotropic cosmological models. …each model starts with a Big Bang [emphasis mine 
here]…In Figure.27.13a,b,c, I have tried to depict the time-evolution of the universe, 
according to Friedmann’s original analysis of the Einstein equation, for the different 
alternative choices of spatial curvature. In each case, the universe starts form a 
singularity [emphasis in the original]—the so-called Big Bang—where spacetime 
curvatures become infinite and then it expands rapidly outwards.” (Penrose [2005], p. 
719) 
122
 Stephen Hawking and G.F.R. Ellis ([1973], pp. 358-9) have argued similarly.  
123
 See the review of many of these theorems in (Hawking and Ellis [1973], pp. 261-75). 
124
 (Hawking and Penrose [1970], p. 529). This paper also provides an excellent review of both Hawking 
and Penrose’s previous work on singularity theorems (see especially [ibid.], pp. 529-33). 
125
 (Hawking [1996], p. 19). 
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seemingly modest conditions, one of which demanded that space-time be described by Einstein’s 
field equations along with a cosmological constant that is non-positive (i.e., negative or equal to 
zero in value). It turned out that this modest condition was not modest enough. When 
inflationary stages of cosmic evolution are added to the standard model, a positive cosmological 
constant is required, thus, the Hawking-Penrose theorem “cannot be directly applied” to such 
models.
126
  
Later theorems were proven. One of these was a result of the work of Arvind Borde and 
Alexander Vilenkin ([1996], pp. 819-22). They showed that a space-time is past-null 
geodesically incomplete if that space-time satisfies what were perceived to be even more modest 
conditions than those used to deliver erstwhile singularity theorems.
127
 One such condition (viz., 
the null convergence condition which is implied by the weak energy condition) was shown to be 
problematic in light of diffusion regions, and so that condition was not mild enough.
128
  
Borde and Vilenkin would later return, this time with Alan Guth, to prove a newer 
theorem.
129
 The Borde-Guth-Vilenkin (BGV) theorem entails that all space-times whose Hubble 
parameters are on average greater than zero, are past-geodesically incomplete.
130
 Notice that the 
theorem does not necessarily suggest that the relevant space-times feature an initial singularity. 
This is because the theorem is not actually a singularity theorem.
131
 The theorem only implies 
that every past-null or past-timelike geodesic is such that it cannot extend further than a past-
boundary ℬ.132  
The BGV has broad application potential since it only relies on a single, model 
independent assumption. For example, Borde, Guth, and Vilenkin apply the theorem to the early 
cyclic cosmogenic model of Steinhardt and Turok ([2002a]).
133
 They also apply the theorem to a 
                                                             
126
 The quoted bit is from (Hawking and Penrose [1970], p. 531). Of course, they were not concerned with 
inflationary cosmology in 1970. Here is the broader context of the quote, “…we shall require the slightly stronger 
energy condition given in (3.4), than that used in I. This means that our theorem cannot be directly applied when a 
positive cosmological constant  is present.” (Hawking and Penrose [1970], p. 531 emphasis in the original). Many 
authors have noted that inflationary cosmological models violate the strong energy condition (the condition having 
to do with the value of  of the Hawking-Penrose theorem. See, for example, (Wall [2013], pp. 25-6. n. 13; and 
Borde and Vilenkin [1996], p. 824. n. 17), inter alios. 
127
 The three conditions are stated in (Borde and Vilenkin [1996, p. 819]). 
128
 In fact, Borde and Vilenkin themselves admitted that the weak energy condition is violated in certain 
space-time regions, when in those regions quantum fluctuations of the inflaton field dominate respective dynamics. 
These are the diffusion regions of the relevant space-times (Borde and Vilenkin [1997], p. 718). The weak energy 
condition implies the null convergence condition, and so if the latter condition does not hold in some space-time 
region, neither does the former. Borde and Vilenkin would also determine that an averaged or integral form of the 
null convergence condition is of no use in bypassing the diffusion problem (Borde and Vilenkin [1997], p. 719-20). 
129
 (Borde, Guth, and Vilenkin [2003]). 
130
 “The result depends on just one assumption: The Hubble parameter H has a positive value when 
averaged over the affine parameter of a past-directed null or noncomoving timelike geodesic.” (Borde, Guth, and 
Vilenkin [2003], p. 151301-4). See also (Mithani and Vilenkin [2012], p. 1 “…it [the BGV] states simply that past 
geodesics are incomplete provided that the expansion rate averaged along the geodesic is positive: Hav > 0.”); and 
(Vilenkin [2013a], [2013b], p. 2]). 
131
 See (Agullo, Ashtekar, and Nelson [2013], p. 2; Easson, Sawicki, and Vikman [2013], p. 1; and 
Guendelman and Steiner [2013], p. 1) who all suggest that the BGV demonstrates that inflationary space-times have 
initial singularities. This is not right. The point I’m making here was made by Vilenkin in his ([2013a], [2013b], p. 
2). 
132
 (Vilenkin [2013a], p. 2 “All it [the BGV theorem] says is that an expanding region of spacetime cannot 
be extended to the past beyond some boundary ℬ. All past-directed timelike and null geodesics, except perhaps a set 
of measure zero, reach this boundary in a finite proper time (finite affine parameter in the null case).”) 
133
 (Borde, Guth, and Vilenkin [2003], p. 151301-4); Guth [2004], p. 49 stated,  
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particular part of the ultra-large-scale structure in the higher-dimensional model of Martin 
Bucher ([2002]). This latter application is apropos because it is very loosely analogous to an 
application of the BGV to our independent nucleated metagalaxy on the CC-M.
134
 One need not 
apply the BGV to ultra-large scale structure in toto. 
Our space-time or metagalaxy is such that it can be accurately described with a Hubble 
constant whose value is on average greater than zero. Hence, the BGV theorem can be easily 
applied to our metagalaxy. This point is underscored by the fact that the BGV was originally 
developed for the purposes of demonstrating that inflationary models are past-incomplete. 
Carroll and Chen are fans of inflation (a fortiori eternal inflation). They believe that in the past 
our metagalaxy exhibited an extraordinary inflationary stage of cosmic evolution. And so the 
theorem should be easily applicable to our metagalaxy as understood by the CC-M. 
Is the presence of a past-boundary indicative of an initial singularity? For my present 
intents and purposes, it is. FGG define an initial singularity as “…a point on the boundary of 
space-time at which at least one backward-going (maximally extended) null geodesic 
terminates.”135 The BGV entails such geodesic incompleteness given that our metagalaxy 
satisfies the Hubble parameter condition (which on the CC-M it does). 
C&C discuss the BGV theorem, citing (Borde, Guth, and Vilenkin [2003]) and 
interpreting the result in such a way that it suggests that eternal inflationary models have 
singularities.
136
 This reading of the theorem is multiply flawed (q.v., note 131).
137
 C&C seem to 
imagine that because singularities “occur all the time at the center of black holes, and eventually 
disappear as the black hole evaporates” the BGV is unproblematic for their model.138 They go on 
to remark that the fact that the theorem entails the presence of singularities does not itself entail 
that there is a “spacelike” boundary “for the entire spacetime.”139 Again, this is just a 
misstatement of the result. The theorem implies the existence of just such a boundary (as 
Vilenkin himself noted).
140
 An interesting, separate question is whether or not the BGV applies 
to the Universe, or to our metagalaxy given the CC-M. I have argued that it at least applies to our 
metagalaxy.  
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
“One particular application of the theory [he has in mind the BGV theorem] is the cyclic ekpyrotic 
model of Steinhardt & Turok ([2002]). This model has Hav > 0 for null geodesics for a single 
cycle, and since every cycle is identical, Hav > 0 when averaged over all cycles. The cyclic model 
is therefore past-incomplete and requires a boundary condition in the past.” 
See also (Mithani and Vilenkin [2012], pp. 1-2). 
134
 Keep in mind that on the CC-M, our metagalaxy is an autonomous, independent space-time. Inquiring 
about whether or not the BGV applies to our metagalaxy and not the entire Universe makes sense. 
135
 (Farhi, Guth, and Guven [1990], p. 419). 
136
 (Carroll and Chen [2004], p. 27. n. 6). 
137
 Vilenkin stated, ([2013b], p. 2) “[e]ven though the BGV theorem is sometimes called a ‘singularity 
theorem’, it does not imply the existence of spacetime singularities.” 
138
 (Carroll and Chen [2004], p. 27. n. 6). 
139
 Ibid. 
140
 Susskind interprets the results of the BGV theorem accurately. He ([2012a], p. 3, cf. [2012b]) provided a 
“for all intents and purposes”-response to the theorem, noting that “…in any kind of inflating cosmology the odds 
strongly (infinitely) favor the beginning to be so far in the past that it is effectively at minus infinity.” (The latter 
part of this sentence is a quotation of Susskind [2012a], p. 3, not the former). While I believe that in the context of 
the CC-M, Susskind’s worry would be relegated to ultra-large scale structure, i.e., the question of whether or not the 
Universe is past-geodesically incomplete, I believe that a proper response to him need not go beyond, “so what?”.  
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5.3 Evasion by the Quantum? 
 
What about escaping the singularity and geodesic incompleteness via the quantum? 
Surely there is some hope that a more complete cosmogenic model outfitted with a full-blooded 
quantum understanding of gravity will consign our metagalaxy’s initial singularity and past 
boundary to the trash bin of physical cosmology. McInnes reports that “[i]t has been 
argued…that quantum-mechanical effects allow the singularity in the Farhi-Guth ‘wormhole’ to 
be evaded...”141 Carroll has expressed similar optimism.142 Sadly however, quantum cosmogony 
does not justify such optimism.
143
 There is no piece of classical cosmology on which the BGV 
theorem essentially relies, and for which we have sufficient evidence that that piece will be 
completely done away with in the quantum regime. In other words, the BGV theorem does not 
assume a classical theory of gravity. Vilenkin made this point clear: 
 
A remarkable thing about this theorem is its sweeping generality. We made no 
assumptions about the material content of the universe. We did not even assume 
that gravity is described by Einstein’s equations. So, if Einstein’s gravity requires 
some modification, our conclusion will still hold. The only assumption that we 
made was that the expansion rate of the universe never gets below some nonzero 
value, no matter how small. This assumption should certainly be satisfied in the 
inflating false vacuum. The conclusion is that past-eternal inflation without a 
beginning is impossible.
144
 
 
But what about my use of results which capitalize on the EGS theorem and related reasoning? 
Are not those results classical? Yes, the results are classical. They depend upon the assumption 
that Einstein’s field equations describe the cosmos.145 However, we have no conclusive evidence 
that these results will be overturned by a complete quantum cosmology. 
 Perhaps you are still dissatisfied with my argumentation. The question, “how can we be 
sure that there is an initial space-time singularity at ℬ in a full quantum physical context?” may 
still strike you as a deep worry.
146
 I believe I can mollify the force of such a worry, since Aron 
Wall ([2013]) has recently proven a quantum singularity theorem that relies only upon the 
                                                             
141
 (McInnes [2007], p. 20, who cites Fischler, Morgan, and Polchinski [1990]; though cf. Vachaspati 
[2007]). 
142
 See (Carroll [2008a], p. 4, [2010], p. 50, pp. 349-50, particularly p. 408. n. 277 “Also, the concept of a 
‘singularity’ from classical general relativity is unlikely to survive intact in a theory of quantum gravity.”), but cf. 
(Penrose [1996], p. 36) for a different view.  
143
 In his final analysis, Carroll ([2010], p. 350) admits that he is currently agnostic about the question of 
whether or not the big bang event is a true beginning for our space-time. 
144
 (Vilenkin [2006], p. 175 emphasis mine). Abhay Ashtekar ([2009], p. 9), a loop quantum cosmology 
proponent, acknowledged that the BGV does not rely on Einstein’s field equations. 
145
 In fact, the theorem is sometimes referred to as “the Ehlers-Geren-Sachs theorem of general relativity”. 
(Clarkson, Coley, and O’Neill [2001], p. 063510-1). 
146
 After all, is it not the case that both loop quantum cosmology (see Bojowald [2001], [2005]; and 
Ashtekar [2009]) and string-theoretic cosmology do away with initial singularities? Perhaps. Remember though that 
string cosmology is inconsistent with the CC-M since such approaches are incompatible with C&C’s background 
space. Moreover, recall that loop quantum gravity implies the N-bound, and the N-bound implies that entropy cannot 
be unbounded from above (see sect.3). And besides, adding a loop quantum cosmology to the CC-M transmutes that 
model into something quite different. C&C explicitly reject loop quantum cosmology in their ([2004], p. 29. They 
reject it because they believe it “invokes special low-entropy conditions on some Cauchy surface…”). 
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generalized second law (GSL),
147
 which states that generalized entropy never decreases as time 
marches forward.
148
  
While the GSL does not hold for any and all horizons, it does hold for de Sitter 
horizons
149
, “any future-infinite timelike worldline”150, and “every state of the universe”.151 
Moreover, given that the GSL holds for every state, its time-reverse will hold for every state.
152
 
The time-reverse GSL says “that for any past-infinite worldline Wpast, the past horizon Hpast =
 
 
  +(Wpast) cannot increase as time passes…”
153
  
Now, what Wall shows is the following equivalence: 
 
(7): The GSL is true, just in case, given that there is some null surface F 
according to which the generalized entropy is diminishing on F at an arbitrary 
point, F is not a horizon.
154
 
 
But (7) implies: 
 
(8): It is not the case that there is an infinite (toward the future) worldline Wfut, 
which relates to F in such a way that F is—for the relevant observer—a future 
horizon.
155
 
 
Therefore, by Wall’s theorem 3, some null surfaces cannot be indefinitely extended.156 This 
conclusion can be tied to two assumptions (viz., that the GSL holds, and that global hyperbolicity 
holds
157
) and then used to show that the relevant space-time (for which the assumptions hold, and 
                                                             
147
 It seems that C&C go in for a generalized second law. In their discussion of black hole entropy and 
Hawking radiation, they stated that “one can prove [69], [70], [71], [72] certain versions of the Generalized Second 
Law, which guarantees that the radiation itself, free to escape to infinity, does have a larger entropy than the original 
black hole.” (Carroll and Chen [2004], p. 18) 
148
 Or, with respect to any causal horizon, the sum of the horizon entropy, plus the field entropy external to 
any such horizon will necessarily increase as time marches forward (Wall, [2012], p. 104049-1). Interestingly, the 
GSL implies that the thermodynamic behavior of certain open systems (e.g., a causal horizon’s exterior) is akin to 
that of certain closed systems (ibid.).  
I should add here that Wall is chiefly concerned with the fine-grained GSL defined in (Wall ([2013], p. 6, 
cf. p. 10)). The fine-grained version of the GSL requires a “fine-grained…definition of the state…used to 
compute…entropy.” ([ibid.], p. 10) This means that the state one uses for computational purposes represents “the 
complete information about a state”, and not just “information available to an observer”. ([ibid.], p. 6) What I say in 
the main text above is true for the fine-grained GSL. So understand all subsequent reference to the GSL as reference 
to the fine-grained GSL. 
149
 (Wall [2012], p. 104049-1). Davies ([1984]), and Davies et. al. ([1986]) argued that a GSL applies to de 
Sitter space, though cf. Davis, Davies, and Lineweaver ([2003]). 
150
 (Wall [2013], p. 9). 
151
 (Wall [2013], p. 10). 
152
 (Wall [2013], p. 10, and see also [2009]). 
153
 (Wall [2013], p. 10) emphasis in the original. 
154
 Paraphrased from (Wall [2013], p. 18). 
155
 (Wall [2013]). 
156
 Theorem 3 is stated and proven in (Wall [2013], p. 19). 
157
 With respect to space-times like our metagalaxy, Garrett DeWeese wrote, “…all standard models of the 
Big Bang are globally hyperbolic” (DeWeese [2004], p. 82). Moreover, global hyperbolicity trivially holds for de 
Sitter space-time, since that space-time features a global Cauchy hypersurface. See (Geroch [1970], and Hawking 
and Ellis [1973], pp. 209-10; cf. p. 263; cf. Bernal and Sánchez [2003]).  
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for which null surfaces cannot be indefinitely extended) is future-null-geodesically incomplete 
“because there is a singularity somewhere on [F].”158  
A similar result can be proven given the time-reversed GSL. This means that one can 
show that the relevant space-time is past-null-geodesically incomplete.
159
 Wall explicitly notes 
how his results can be understood within a quantum context ([2013], p. 20; pp. 32-37) and 
correctly observes that he has secured something like a quantum analog of Penrose’s ([1965]) 
singularity theorem.  
With respect to an application of Wall’s theorem to our FLRW metagalaxy, he stated: 
 
Putting all these considerations together, if the GSL is a valid law of nature, it 
strongly suggests that either the universe had a finite beginning in time, or else it 
is spatially finite and the arrow of time was reversed previous to the Big Bang. In 
the latter case, it could still be said that the universe had a beginning in a 
thermodynamic sense, because both branches of the cosmology would be to the 
thermodynamic future of the Big Bang.
160
 
 
Of course, the CC-M posits an eternally inflating FLRW sub-model of our metagalaxy. Thus, the 
reversed arrow of time idea cannot be added to that sub-model.
161
 We can conclude then, that 
Wall provides us with yet another reason for why we ought to believe that our metagalaxy is 
past-null geodesically incomplete.
162
 This, I believe, serves as a significant defeater for the claim 
that our metagalaxy nucleated by means of the FGG mechanism from a background de Sitter 
space. 
 
5.4 Fluctuation 
 
The means by which our metagalaxy came forth out of a background space need not have 
involved a quantum tunneling process like the one recommended by FGG. In fact, C&C’s 
original paper ([2004]) did not use the FGG mechanism. Rather, it urged that a suitable proto-
inflationary patch could have—via the harmonic oscillation of a potential—fluctuated into 
existence from the background de Sitter space. But C&C believe that the probability that the 
relevant patch should fluctuate into existence by means of the recommended process is 
incredibly small. And that this patch should spark the process of eternal inflation is also regarded 
as incredibly improbable.
163
 In fact, the probability is so small that C&C describe it as possibly 
“the smallest positive number in the history of physics…”164 C&C can acknowledge 
                                                             
158
 (Wall [2013], p. 19]). And see the proof for this in ([ibid.], pp. 19-20). 
159
 (Wall [2013], p. 20). 
160
 (Wall [2013], p. 27). 
161
 Plus C&C rejected that picture when they rejected the Aguirre-Gratton model. See (Carroll and Chen 
[2004], p. 29). 
162
 You might maintain that C&C need not appropriate the FGG proposal. There are, after all, suggested 
improvements of the tunneling story told there. Why then cannot C&C simply side-step the objections in this section 
by appropriating one of these ameliorations. The problem is that improvements like the one in (Fischler, Morgan and 
Polchinski [1990]) fail if our bubble metagalaxy features an initial singularity. That is why they diligently seek to 
rub initial singularities out (see [1990], pp. 4046-7). 
163
 (Carroll and Chen [2004], p. 25). There is also the separate question of how likely it is that our 
metagalaxy’s large scale structure is due to some prior inflationary era. Carroll and Tam address this question to 
some degree in their ([2010]). 
164
 (Carroll and Chen [2004], p. 26. n. 4). 
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wholeheartedly such a small probability without fear or trepidation because their model is very 
much a “wait and see” model (cf. McInnes [2007] p. 8). Because the background space-time is 
eternal, and geodesically complete, fluctuations of just the right sort will inevitably occur, a 
fortiori, they will occur an infinite amount of times. On this “wait and see” feature of the model, 
C&C stated: 
 
The total spacetime volume of the de Sitter phase will continue to increase, just as 
in eternal inflation. The total spacetime volume of the de Sitter phase is therefore 
infinite, and the transition into our proto-inflationary universe is guaranteed 
eventually to occur. Indeed, it will eventually occur an infinite number of times.
165
 
 
The point bears repeating. Because the de Sitter vacuum is both unstable and eternal, anything 
that can physically occur, will occur, and it will occur an infinite amount of times.
166
  
One can see how the infinities are in some sense compounded on the CC-M once one 
realizes that the mechanism for producing the large scale structure of our metagalaxy is eternal 
inflation. According to Alan Guth, on such a sub-model, “anything that can happen will happen: 
in fact, it will happen an infinite number of times.”167 The latter implication of eternal inflation is 
relevant since—you will remember—the means by which entropy increases without bound is 
through the birth of metagalaxies. Because our metagalaxy will evolve into a de Sitter space, it 
will eventually start to behave like the background Universe, and spawn proto-inflationary 
patches which eternally inflate into even more metagalaxies. But you see, Guth’s point is that 
eternal inflation also implies the inevitable birth of other metagalaxies without the extra thesis 
that our metagalaxy is an asymptotically de Sitter space-time. For on eternal inflation, certain 
regions of space never stop inflating. Some of these inflating regions will give birth to other 
universes in which physical constants and parameters may vary.
168
  
 So the background universe yields an infinite amount of metagalaxies, and an infinite 
amount of these will, through eternal inflation, yield an infinite amount of metagalaxies as well. 
What’s the problem? The problem is that this wreaks havoc on probability judgments. If your 
sample space is infinite, it does not appear possible to have a well-defined probability measure to 
underwrite your probability and likelihood judgments. This problem of infinities and 
probabilities in eternal inflation-based cosmologies is well-known.
169
 However, it is also well-
known that there is no current satisfactory solution to the problem. In fact, Steinhardt noted that 
“[m]any remain hopeful even though they have been wrestling with this issue for the past 25 
years and have yet to come up with a plausible solution.”170  
                                                             
165
 (Carroll and Chen [2004], p. 27 emphasis mine. Cf. p. 23) 
166
 This is a general property of the quantum vacuum. See (Redhead [1995a], [1995b]; and Summers 
[2012]).  
167
 (Guth [2004], p. 49). Steinhardt ([2011], p. 43) stated, “[t]he truth is that quantum physics rules 
inflation, and anything that can happen will happen.” 
168
 See on this (Linde [2004], pp. 431-432; and Steinhardt [2011], p. 42). 
169
 See (Page [2008], p. 063536-1) and the literature cited there. 
170
 (Steinhardt [2011], p. 42 emphasis mine). Guth ([2004], p. 50) concluded similarly, “…we still do not 
have a compelling argument from first principles that determines how probabilities should be calculated.” 
Elsewhere, Steinhardt and Turok ([2005], p. 44) remarked: 
“What is the probability distribution? In models such as eternal inflation, the relative 
likelihood of our being in one region or another is ill-defined since there is no unique 
time slicing and, therefore, no unique way of assessing the number of regions or their 
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 Notice that my criticism here would run even if C&C dispensed with eternal inflating 
sub-models. The problem of infinities appears when theorizing about ultra-large-scale structure 
(i.e., the Universe). The problem is compounded when eternal inflating sub-models of 
metagalaxies such as our own are added in. I conclude then, that while C&C’s original paper 
does not invoke the FGG mechanism (despite judgments from Carroll to the contrary), a 
heretofore unresolved theoretical problem remains, the problem of infinity and likelihood.
171
 
 
6 Causation and the CC-M 
 
Ignoring the CC-M’s incompleteness, I have argued that it still fails to provide an 
adequate scientific explanation of our initial low-entropy state, since two claims essential to the 
CC-M (claims (2) and (3)) are false. By appeal to an argument for the well-foundedness of the 
causal relation, I will now argue that claim (1) is false as well. 
 
6.1 Preliminaries 
 
For the purposes of the main argument in this section, I will assume that purely 
contingent facts are proper relata for obtaining causal relations. Such facts are particular kinds of 
concrete states of affairs involving contingent substances or substrates exemplifying properties 
or standing in relations.
172
 The nexuses of exemplification within purely contingent facts tie 
together contingent substrates (and only contingent substrates) with respective properties.
173
 The 
relations within purely contingent facts relate contingent substrates and only contingent 
substrates to one another. Moreover, the improper parts of all purely contingent facts must 
themselves be contingent. An improper part of an object o just is o.
174
 Thus; no purely contingent 
fact exists in every single world.
175
 
I allow for complex purely contingent facts. Call such complexes higher-order purely 
contingent facts. Such higher-order purely contingent facts are themselves purely contingent in 
the sense that only contingent substrates fuse together and help comprise the respective high-
order sums. Higher-order purely contingent facts are therefore purely contingent. This holds only 
if the following principle is true:  
 
[Interpretation: ∇x: x is purely contingent (where what it means to be purely 
contingent is to only have substrates that are contingent as proper parts or 
constituents, though the entity in question may have properties or relations as 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
volumes. Brave souls have begun to head down this path, but it seems likely to us to drag 
a beautiful science towards the darkest depths of metaphysics.” 
171
 Even if a measure were found, one must still overcome the Boltzmann Brains problem. See (Page 
[2008]), and the literature cited therein. 
172
 Michael Tooley believes that states of affairs are causal relata. See (Tooley [2003], p. 408). 
173
 Reminiscent of Chisholm’s understanding of events in his ([1990], p. 419 see definition D11). See also 
(Koons [2000], pp. 31-43). 
174
 (Simons [1987], p. 11). 
175
 This is one reason why [Cicero is Cicero] is not a purely contingent fact, for I consider that fact to be 
such that it exists at all worlds since it is true in all worlds and I (waiving in the direction of Thomas Crisp, and 
Timothy Williamson) am skeptical of a truth-in/truth-at distinction. I am also assuming the falsity of necessitism 
(the thesis that necessarily, every entity is necessarily some entity). I do find Williamson’s ([2013]) defense of 
necessitism convincing, and so I merely assume contingentism (the negation of necessitism) here for the purposes of 
deliberation, since most philosophers seem to be contingentists. 
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constituents); Cxy: x is substrate-composed solely of y (where what it means for x 
to be substrate-composed solely of y, is for x to have y as its only proper part that 
is a substrate, though x may also have as proper parts or constituents properties or 
relations); Domain: unrestricted] 
 
(Purely Contingent Parts Principle, PCPP): ■∀x(Ǝys((Cxys & ∇ys) ⊃ ∇x)) 
 
That is to say, necessarily, for any entity x, if there are some ys, such that x is substrate-
composed solely of the ys, and the ys are purely contingent, then x is purely contingent. The 
above principle makes use of “plural referring expressions” or plural quantification, but as Peter 
van Inwagen has said, that idea “has sufficient currency” contemporarily.176, 177 PCPP seems to 
me to be highly intuitive. I do not have an argument for it, and so I should perhaps adopt a 
generally good dialectical strategy at this point and place a defeasibility operator ‘Ð’ in front of 
PCPP: 
 
 (PCPP*): Ð■[∀x(Ǝys((Cxys & ∇ys) ⊃ ∇x))] 
 
That is to say, normally, necessarily, for any entity x, if there are some ys, such that x is 
substrate-composed solely of the ys, and the ys are purely contingent, then x is purely 
contingent.
178
 
 I have argued in more than one place, that all purely contingent facts have causes.
179
 I 
will not revisit my reasoning for such a conclusion here. I will simply assume the universality of 
causation, and proceed in demonstrating that the causal relation is well-founded with respect to 
purely contingent facts.                      
 
6.2 The Well-Foundedness of Causation 
 
In his very important work, Realism Regained: An Exact Theory of Causation, Teleology, 
and the Mind ([2000]), Robert Koons proffered a very interesting argument for the well-
foundedness of the causal relation (see p. 113) which depended upon the universality of 
causation. A close cousin of that argument proceeds as follows.  
All purely contingent facts have causes, and there is a purely contingent fact m that is the 
sum of all purely contingent facts. If all purely contingent facts have causes, then m has a cause, 
call it c. Moreover, if for any obtaining causal relation which composes m, the cause in such a 
relation is preempted by c, then it is not the case that there is a complex purely contingent fact m 
that is the sum of all purely contingent facts, since every would-be cause would fail to actually 
bring about the relevant effect. Now, if c causes m, then either, for any obtaining causal relation 
which composes m, the cause in such a relation will be preempted by c, or else c causes m by 
indirectly (through the transitivity of causation) causing all of its constituent purely contingent 
facts by being the initial cause of m’s earliest obtaining purely contingent fact or facts. However, 
if m were an infinitely long causal chain whose links involved only purely contingent facts, then 
it would be false that c causes m by indirectly (through the transitivity of causation) causing all 
                                                             
176
 (van Inwagen [1990], p. 23). 
177
 For more on plural quantification, see (Uzquiano [2003]; van Inwagen [1990], pp. 23-32). 
178
 On defeasibility reasoning see (Koons [2013]). 
179
 (Weaver [2012], [forthcoming]). 
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of its initial constituent purely contingent facts. But now, assume that m is an infinitely long 
causal chain whose links involve only purely contingent facts. It will now follow that the 
proposition <c causes m by indirectly (through the transitivity of causation) causing all of its 
constituent purely contingent facts by being the initial cause of m’s initial obtaining purely 
contingent fact or facts> is false. Additionally, it follows that if c causes m, then for any 
obtaining causal relation which composes m, the cause in such a relation is preempted by c. And 
so if m has a cause c, then it is not the case that there is a complex purely contingent fact m that 
is the sum of all purely contingent facts. But the universality of causation entails that there is a 
cause c of m. Therefore, it is not the case that there is a complex purely contingent fact m that is 
the sum of all purely contingent facts. But now we have an absurdity: there is a purely contingent 
fact m that is the sum of all purely contingent facts, and it is not the case that there is a purely 
contingent fact m that is the sum of all purely contingent facts. We can now safely conclude that 
it is not the case that m is an infinitely long causal chain whose links involve only purely 
contingent facts. 
Why would one maintain that: 
 
(9): If m has a cause c, then either for any obtaining causal relation which 
composes m, the cause in such a relation is preempted by c, or else c causes m by 
indirectly (through the transitivity of causation) causing all of its constituent 
purely contingent facts by being the initial cause of m’s earliest obtaining purely 
contingent fact or facts. 
 
Why could we not uphold the claim that c causes m by causing—via overdetermination—all of 
m’s constituent purely contingent facts? Koons ([2000], p. 113) fails to (at least) explicitly defend 
the supposition that we are dealing here with a case of preemption instead of a case of symmetric 
overdetermination, or even joint causation.  
There are several ways to supplement Koons’s argumentation. We might follow Martin 
Bunzl who argued that symmetric overdetermination is impossible (see Bunzl [1979]), though he 
still admitted that there is explanatoral overdetermination see p. 145), but Bunzl’s reasoning 
requires a specific analysis of events, particularly the analysis of Donald Davidson 
([1967]).
180
 Davidson’s analysis includes identity or individuation conditions for events 
(Davidson [1969], [2001], p. 179), where some event e1 is identical to some other event e2, just 
in case, for any event x, x directly causes e1 just in case, x directly causes e2, and for any 
event x, e1 directly causes x just in case, e2 directly causes x (see [ibid.]; and the discussion in 
Simons [2003], p. 374). This view of the identity conditions of events is flawed, for as Myles 
Brand ([1977], p. 332) pointed out, it equates all events which do not have direct causes, and 
which do not directly cause other events.  It is an undesirable consequence that all ineffectual 
events are identical.
181
 So we should abandon Davidson’s analysis of events because of its view 
of the identity conditions of causal relata. 
There is a different path for defending a related but weaker thesis: With respect to the 
actual world, there are no cases of overdetermination. One might have good reasons for believing 
                                                             
180
 See (Bunzl [1979], p. 145, and p. 150). 
181
 I do believe that some events do not have causes (e.g., the event or state of affairs of God’s causing the 
cosmos). 
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in explanatory exclusion, and causal closure.
182
 Some believe that if those two dogmas hold, then 
there are no actual cases of overdetermination. Wim De Muijnck goes further, “[m]etaphysically 
speaking, no such thing as overdetermination seems possible; this is a consequence…of causal 
closure and explanatory exclusion”.183 I, however, find causal closure to be objectionable, and so 
it is best to look for proper substantiation of (9) elsewhere. 
Some philosophers have suggested that symmetric overdetermination is 
improbable.
184
 One response to this charge which draws from (Schaffer [2003], pp. 27-29; and 
Paul [2007]) is that “quantitative”185, and/or “constitutive overdetermination”186 is prevalent.  If 
one is a non-reductionist about the structure of material objects, then a great many cases of 
macroscopic causation will involve Paul’s constitutive overdetermination, in that the parts which 
compose such wholes (any macro-level material entity) will contribute to causally producing that 
which the macro-level entity (the whole) brings about (cf. Paul
187
 [2007], pp. 276-277). Schaffer 
recommends that one fend off the objection that parts of the causally efficacious object are not 
metaphysically distinct enough to breed overdetermination, by noting that the parts are 
“nomologically correlated” while still “metaphysically distinct”.188 I agree with Schaffer’s 
response.  
Let me recommend a different strategy. Give attention to a standard explication of 
symmetric overdetermination as articulated by L.A. Paul ([2007], pp. 269-270 emphasis mine): 
 
In contemporary discussions of causation, standard cases of symmetric causal 
overdetermination are defined (roughly) as cases involving multiple distinct 
causes of an effect where the causation is neither joint, additive, nor preemptive 
(and it is assumed the overdetermining causes do not cause each other)…Each 
cause makes exactly the same causal contribution as the other causes to the effect 
(so the causal overdetermination is symmetric); each cause without the others is 
sufficient for the effect; and for each cause the causal process from cause to effect 
is not interrupted.
189
 
 
                                                             
182
 Kim defined causal closure as the thesis that “…any physical event that has a cause at time t has a 
physical cause at t.” (Kim [1989b], p. 43 emphasis in the original). He says that explanatory exclusion is the 
principle that “[n]o event can be given more than one complete and independent explanation.” (Kim [1989a], p. 79 
emphasis in the original). 
183
 De Muijnck ([2003], p. 65). 
184
 You get a hint of this in (Kim [1989a], p. 86; Schaffer cites Kim [1998] along these lines). Cf. the 
discussion in (Schaffer [2003], pp. 27-9 and see footnote 6 on p. 41). 
185
 Mackie’s term, from Mackie ([1974], p. 43); cf. De Muijnck ([2003], pp. 65-6); Schaffer ([2003], p. 28). 
Schaffer tells us that, “…quantitative overdetermination occurs whenever the cause is decomposable into distinct 
and independently sufficient parts”. Schaffer ([2003], p. 28). 
186
 Paul’s term from (Paul [2007]). 
187
 I should point out that Paul believes that the consequence of there being such prevalent constitutive 
overdetermination is “mysterious and problematic”. Paul ([2007], p. 277). She attempts to rid the world of such 
prevalence by arguing that fundamental causal relata are property instances shared by overlapping entities involved 
in obtaining causal relations. See (Paul [2007], p. 282). 
188
 (Schaffer [2003], p. 42. n. 9 emphasis in the original). The objection is tied to (Kim [1989a]). Some 
interpret Kim as suggesting that overdetermination just doesn’t involve the causation of an event by an object and 
the parts which compose it. See (Sider [2003], p. 719. n. 2). 
189
 See also (Sider [2003], p. 719. n. 2). 
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Now pick out an arbitrary obtaining causal relation which composes m. Label the cause D, and 
the effect E. If we understand symmetric overdetermination in the way Paul recommends, we 
cannot say that c is a direct overdetermining cause with D of E, precisely because c is a cause 
of D in that it is the cause of m. Perhaps a charitable reading of (Koons [2000], p. 113) would 
suggest that by his admission that (in the case as I have adjusted it) c is “causally prior” to D in 
that c is also the cause of D, c and D cannot be overdetermining causes of E. On the charitable 
reading, my attempted improvement on (Koons [2000], p. 113) per this pericope only involves 
further elaboration upon just how causal priority precludes a symmetric overdetermination 
reading of the relevant case. 
One might think that the charitable reading does not help preclude a joint causation 
understanding of the case of concern. But this is not right. We were supposing in the Koons-style 
reasoning above that D is a sufficient cause of E. So D is enough to bring about E, and since we 
are not dealing here with symmetric overdetermination, the relationship between c, D, 
and E must be understood in terms of asymmetric overdetermination, i.e., preemption. 
The above Koons-style argument will generalize to any infinitely long causal chain 
composed of obtaining causal relations which feature only purely contingent facts. 
6.3 Well-Foundedness and the CC-M 
 
The background space of the CC-M contains two actual infinities on each side of the 
“initial” Cauchy hypersurface.190 Each infinity spawns a sea of infinite metagalaxies. There 
therefore seems to be two senses in which the CC-M implies the existence of an infinitely long 
causal chain.  
First, the actual infinities in the background space involve an ongoing infinite process of 
cosmic evolution via the evolution of the de Sitter space-time. We can choose a random 
arbitrarily large surface of the space-time, sum it up and judge that such a surface will serve as a 
causal dependency base for some subsequent exceedingly large surface of the same space-time. 
That surface will also serve as a causal dependency base for some succeeding surface and so on 
ad infinitum. Thus, the CC-M implies that there is an infinitely long causal dependency chain.
191
 
Such dependency will suffice as insurance for respective obtaining causal relations, and so the 
CC-M likewise implies that there is an infinitely long causal chain. 
The other sense in which the CC-M may imply an infinitely long chain of obtaining 
causal relations is connected to metagalaxy nucleation. Carroll seems to regard the pinching off 
of a metagalaxy from the Universe as a causal process. Thus, if that process really does obtain 
infinitely many times, then we can sum up an arbitrary metagalaxy with the first proper parts of 
the nucleation process including the pinching off phenomena. That sum will serve as a causal 
dependency base for the birth of a metagalaxy. But because there is bound to be somewhere an 
infinitely long chain of “just so” birthing (i.e., a chain in which asymptotically de Sitter space-
times give birth to more and more asymptotically de Sitter space-times), daughters of space-time 
birthing processes can sum up with their own birthing processes and thereby serve as causal 
dependency bases for their newborns. The CC-M in this way implies an infinitely long causal 
chain. 
                                                             
190
 That is, according to the standard way of understanding de Sitter space-times. 
191
 In the discussion above, I assume a simple counterfactual analysis of causation, not unlike the one 
defended in (Lewis [1973]) or the later more sophisticated analysis in (Lewis [2004]). My point could easily be 
adjusted so as to accommodate other, (perhaps) more plausible accounts of causation. 
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If at least one of the above recommendations of connecting the CC-M to the implication 
that there is an infinitely long causal chain is sound, then the Koons-style argument for well-
foundedness will run, and the CC-M will come out false. 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
 The CC-M is admittedly, though still woefully, incomplete. This incompleteness transfers 
to its proposed scientific explanation of our initial low-entropy state. Even if we grant that the 
model and explanation are in some sense complete, all of its essential claims are false. We 
should therefore refrain from looking to the CC-M for a dynamical explanation of the arrow of 
time. 
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